American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Truth Elicitation in a Nonstrategic Environment
American Economic Review
(pp. 3942–58)
Abstract
A principal decides which party deserves a prize. Only the parties observe the state that determines who is deserving. The principal gives each party a text describing the conditions under which that party deserves the prize and asks each to report the state. The parties are nonstrategic. Each activates a known cheating procedure whose outcome depends on the state and on the text. Implementation is achieved if, whenever the parties disagree, the liar is identified by the "one-way cheating principle": The truthful party is the unique party who could not have produced his story had the rival's story been true.Citation
Glazer, Jacob, and Ariel Rubinstein. 2026. "Truth Elicitation in a Nonstrategic Environment." American Economic Review 116 (10): 3942–58. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20251879Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D82 Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making