American Economic Review
ISSN 0002-8282 (Print) | ISSN 1944-7981 (Online)
Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections
American Economic Review
(pp. 4292–4327)
Abstract
I study multidistrict legislative elections with two parties and two binary dimensions of policy. Strategic voters focus on the dimension where their district is most likely to be pivotal in the legislature. Anticipating this, candidates select different policies than they would in single-district elections. The final policy is (i) uniquely pinned down by voter preferences, (ii) preferred by a majority of districts on each dimension, and (iii) a Condorcet winner if one exists. These properties are not guaranteed in single-district elections.Citation
Hughes, Niall. 2025. "Strategic Voting in Two-Party Legislative Elections." American Economic Review 115 (12): 4292–4327. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220665Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D81 Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D91 Micro-Based Behavioral Economics: Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making