The Female Vote and the Rise of AKP in Turkey[*]

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December 2016

Abstract

We investigate how gender-related differences in voting behavior shaped the rise of the AKP, the moderately Islamic party that has ruled Turkey since 2002. We find that education level and religiosity are the main determinants of voting behavior of both men and women in Turkey. The effect of education on the support for the AKP, however, is dramatically different for men and women in 2002: it is negative for women but hump-shaped for men. We argue that this difference may be driven by expected distributional implications of adopting more conservative religious norms for low-skilled men and women.

Key Words: Gender gap; Voting, Turkey, Justice and Development Party (AKP), Democracy; Islam

JEL Codes: O15; P48; Z12

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1 Introduction

Gender differences in political attitudes and voting behavior have gained importance with the enfranchisement of women at the beginning of the twentieth century. This has led to the preponderance of studies on the political "gender gap" along three dimensions: gender differences in mass political participation (falling in recent years), differences between men's and women's votes (electoral gap), and different party identification of men and women (partisan gap).[1] For the purpose of our study, we use the term gender gap to denote the different voting behavior of men and women. Although the gender gap in voting behavior has significant effects on the results of elections both in developed and developing countries, almost all of studies investigate this phenomenon for developed countries. In contrast, we examine the gender gap in voting behavior of Turkish men and women. Hence, our study fills two important gaps in the literature by considering a country that is both developing and Muslim at the same time.

The most dramatic political development in Turkey's recent history has been the rise of the Justice and Development Party (known as AKP, its Turkish acronym), which was founded in 2001 as a moderately Islamic party. Departing from the previously mainly secular orientation of Turkish mainstream political parties, the AKP advocates a greater role for religious (Islamic) values in the public and private life. The AKP scored a landslide victory in the 2002 election, when it won 34 percent of votes and captured almost two thirds of seats in the parliament (Turkish electoral rules require parties to receive at least 10% of all votes to be represented in the parliament; those that fail to attain this threshold see their votes redistributed to the more successful parties). This was followed by further electoral success in 2007, when the AKP saw its support reach 47 percent, and again in 2011 and 2015 (50 percent on both occasions). In 2014, the AKP leader and incumbent Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won in the first round of the presidential election with 52% of the vote and became the first directly-elected President of Turkey.

Turkey under AKP has gradually abandoned the strict secularism that was in place since Atatürk's founding of the modern Turkish state. On the one hand, this has arguably increased religious freedom, for example, by allowing religious symbols such as headscarves in public buildings, schools and workplaces. On the other hand, the greater acceptance of Islamic norms in everyday life can potentially have an asymmetrically adverse effect on women's lives. A conservative interpretation of Islamic norms ascribes different roles to men and women in most

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[1] See Hill (2003: 69), Conover (1988: 985), and the references therein.

aspects of everyday life, and it gives more power to men than to women. As a result, women's participation in politics, the labor market, social life and/or their equality with men in the legal system are often circumscribed in Muslim countries.[2] Since 2002, the government's actions and pronouncements increasingly reveal such conservative attitudes towards women.[3]

Whether the ascent of AKP in 2002 indeed affected the position of women in the society and the labor market is not clear. Female labor force participation rate fell from 29 percent in 2002 (and 31 percent in 1999, see Table 1) to 25 percent by 2005. The decline in female participation, however, was relatively short-lived: it recovered after 2005, rising to 32 percent in 2013. Male participation rate also fluctuated during the same period although the swings were more modest (especially when considering the much higher initial level) and the decline even more short-lived: from 78 percent in 1999 to 73 percent in 2003, rising subsequently to 76 percent by 2013. It is therefore not clear whether the fall in female participation after the rise of AKP can be attributed to its policy decisions rather than to some other causes, such as the economic crisis that hit Turkey just before the AKP's rise, in 2001.

In fact, it is even possible that the rise of the AKP could improve the labor-market position of women. Myersson (2014) considers an earlier episode in 1994 when a different Islamic party (*Refah*) won in a number of local elections in Turkey. His results suggest that the municipalities controlled by this party subsequently experienced increased secondary-school and high-school enrollment and completion rates. His interpretation of this effect is that pious female students may have been discouraged by the strict secular policies (in particular, the headscarf ban) followed in schools elsewhere. In the longer term, increased human-capital acquisition translated into adolescent marriage rates, higher political participation, and even lower subsequent support for Islamic parties among female voters. In a similar vein, Corekcioglu (2015) considers the effect of AKP on female employment at the level of municipalities. She finds that towns with

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[2] For example, some Muslim societies impose restrictions (either formal or informal) on women's dress, labor-market participation, education, property and inheritance rights, ability to testify in a court of law on equal terms with men, freedom to marry non-Muslims (allowed for men but not for women), entitlements to seek divorce and/or custody over children, or even issues as basic as being allowed to leave one's house unaccompanied or to drive.

[3] As prime minister, Erdoğan, for example, was quoted as suggesting that women should have at least three and ideally five children, stating that he did not believe in men and women being equal (for both, see "Erdogan the Misogynist: Turkish Prime Minister Assaults Women's Rights," Spiegel Online, 19 June 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/turkish-prime-minister-erdogan-targets-women-s-rights-a-839568.html) and equating abortion with murder ("Turkey PM Erdogan sparks row over abortion," BBC News, 1 June 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-18297760). Deputy Prime Minster Arinc, more recently, suggested that women should not laugh in public because doing so was *haram* (prohibited by Islam), they should not be inviting in their attitudes and should protect their chasteness (see "Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Tells Women not to Laugh in Public," Huffington Post, 8 June 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/harut-sassounian/turkish-deputy-prime-mini_b_5656807.html). As president, Erdoğan argued that no Muslims should use family planning and birth control and instead should multiply their descendants ("Turkey's Erdogan warns Muslims against birth control," BBC News, 30 May 2016, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36413097).

AKP mayors do not have significantly different gender composition of municipal employment compared to towns with mayors from other parties.

Given the different roles ascribed to men and women in traditional Muslim societies, it is reasonable to expect differences in the support for the AKP among male and female voters. Similarly, greater application of traditional Islamic norms may have different effects on urban vs rural voters, young vs old, highly skilled/educated vs low-skilled, and so on. This is because the impact of behavioral restrictions imposed by traditional norms should depend on the composition of consumption: household with relatively modern (Westernized) pattern of consumption should be affected more than household following traditional lifestyles. We therefore consider the determinants of support for the AKP, and for the Republican People's Party (CHP), the main opposition party, in the 2002 election, when the AKP rose to power, as well as the subsequent election in 2007, which confirmed its primacy in Turkish politics. Using the European Social Survey, we relate the support for these two parties to a broad array of socio-economic characteristics of respondents, including their gender, education, and religiosity. The results of our analysis suggest that education and religiosity are the main drivers of voting behavior: votes for the AKP increase with religiosity and fall with education, both among male and female voters. When we allow for a non-linear effect of education, however, we observe a remarkable difference between men and women in the 2002 election: while formal education always translates into lower support for AKP among women, the pattern is hump-shaped for men. The peak support for AKP among men is attained at approximately five years of education, which, in Turkey, corresponds to completed primary school education. The pattern of support for the CHP is roughly the reverse of that for the AKP.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we briefly outline the existing literature on the gender gap in voting behavior. In section 3, we express our data sources and methodology. In section 4, we discuss our empirical results in detail and, in section 5, we conclude.

2 Literature Review

The political attitudes of women have become a hotly debated issue as women started to receive the right to vote at the beginning of the twentieth century (the first country to introduce women's suffrage being New Zealand in 1893). In this period, it was speculated that women's vote would be distinctive and induce dramatic changes to party fortunes (Hill, 2003: 70). During the 1950s and 1960s, the difference between the men's and women's votes was modest but nonetheless women were more inclined to support conservative parties both in Western Europe and the

United States. This phenomenon came to be referred to as the "traditional gender gap" (Inglehart-Norris, 2000: 443).

At the end of the 1970s and during the early 1980s, the traditional gender gap seemed to disappear and women begun to move to the left of men in the United States and in many European countries (Manow-Emmenegger, 2012: 10; Iversen-Rosenbluth, 2006: 12). This new cleavage between men's and women's political attitudes was denoted as the "modern gender gap" (Inglehart-Norris, 2000: 444). Since the political differences between men and women are not identical across countries, recent studies of the gender gap have often reached contradictory results about the nature and the extent of the phenomenon.

Previous studies have put forward several explanations of the differing political attitudes of men and women. One of the earliest explanations for the gender gap, namely socialization, emphasizes the childhood experiences of men and women (Studlar et al., 1998: 782). According to this approach, political differences between men and women result from the sex-role conditioning and contrasting moral values conveyed to boys and girls by their parents (Manza-Brooks, 1998: 1240). As a consequence of this traditional socialization, based on the belief that the main responsibility of women is child rearing, women become conditioned to be more concerned about the protection of life and cooperative decision making than men (Alexandre, 2004: 548).

The second approach to gender differences in political attitudes is based on the women's autonomy thesis and asserts that women who are more autonomous from men have a tendency to deviate more from men also in their political behaviors (Howell-Day, 2000: 860). In Becker's influential study on family (1985), it is assumed that the interests of family members are fully harmonized and therefore their political attitudes are expected to be the same. However, because of the differences between the interests of divorced and single women's and the others, some researchers argue that Becker's model becomes inaccurate when the rising divorce rates are taken into account (Iversen-Rosenbluth, 2006; Aidt-Dallal, 2008). Indeed, with the rising divorce rates since 1960s, a number of analysts have found evidence in favor of women's autonomy thesis (Edlund-Pande, 2002; Iversen-Rosenbluth, 2006).

The third approach to explaining the gender gap in political attitudes focuses on women's labor-force participation. This approach observes that although rising participation of women in the labor force has strengthened the position of women, it has not resulted in full equality in the labor market, political life or family. This explains why women are more concerned about unequal treatment and tend to be more leftist than men (Togeby, 1994: 217). According to this

approach, there are three different ways in which increasing labor force participation of women results in a gender gap in political behavior (Manza-Brooks, 1998: 1243): First, the integration of women in the labor force exposes them to policy debates and other information about political campaigns. Hence, political awareness of women rises with their participation in the labor force. Second, since paid employment exposes women to gender inequalities, women tend to support political activism and feminist political goals. Finally, women are more dependent on the public sector for employment than men and they rely much more on social programs for supporting their families. Since leftist parties are generally more biased towards redistributive policies than the rightist parties, working women are apt to vote for the leftist parties.

Increasing labor force participation plays a crucial role in the Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap which has been proposed by Inglehart and Norris (2000). This theory states that in traditional societies, women are dissuaded from participating in the labor force since child bearing and child rearing are regarded as their main objectives. However, in post-industrial societies, increasing labor force participation of women and other cultural changes have had dramatic impact on women's voting behavior.

The fourth explanation of political differences between men's and women's attitudes suggests that the main reason behind the gender gap is the feminist identity and consciousness (Conover, 1988: 988). Conover (1988) states that in the absence of feminism, women's values are dominated by male-oriented values. However, by becoming a feminist, women realize their basic values and form their own attitudes on political issues. According to this approach, feminists generally advocate egalitarian attitudes and thus support left-wing parties far more than non-feminists (Bergh, 2007: 238).

The final approach propounds two alternative hypotheses about this phenomenon (Kaufmann-Petrocik, 1999: 864-866): the Attitude Hypothesis and the Salience Hypothesis. While the Attitude Hypothesis argues that the gender gap stems from the distinct preferences of men and women on different political issues, the Salience Hypothesis asserts that the main reason of the gender gap is the differing weights men and women apply to political issues. For example, while most women may prefer increased social welfare spending and consider abortion as one of the most important issues determining their voting behavior, most men may prefer decreased social welfare spending and give relatively little weight to abortion in their voting decisions (Chaney, 1998: 312). Similarly, economic issues can have differential impacts on men's and women's political choices. As stated by Welch and Hibbing (1994), in contrast to men who behave egocentrically and consider their own economic circumstances in their voting decisions, women have a tendency to behave sociotropically and to take into account the country's economic

conditions instead of their family's while determining their political choices. Although the Attitude and the Salience Hypotheses shed some light on the different political attitudes of men and women about policy issues that directly relate to a person's gender, they are incapable of explaining different political choices about issues in which gender does not play a role. Thus, other socioeconomic and cultural variables should be taken into account when dealing with issues that are not directly related to a person's gender (Bergh, 2007: 239).

Given that few Muslim countries are democracies with free and fair elections, it is not surprising that there is limited literature on the determinants of electoral outcomes in Muslim countries. Nevertheless, the sea change to Turkish politics brought about by the AKP victory in 2002 has resulted in some (limited) interest in the background of AKP's rise. Çarkoğlu and Hinich (2006) emphasize the role played by the main cleavages in Turkish politics and argue that the Islamism vs secularism and Turkish vs Kurdish nationalism dimensions matter more than the standard left-right dimension dominant in Western politics. Çarkoglu (2012), in turn, argues that the rise of AKP has been attributable to ideological rather than to economic concerns of voters. Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar (2005) consider voting intentions and find that AKP supporters include mainly young voters, in particular males, and those who are not in favor of Turkey's entry into the European Union.

As the preceding discussion illustrates, much of the literature on the differences in political preferences of male and female voters focuses on advanced democratic countries, with studies on Muslim countries being particularly rare.[4] In this paper, we seek to help fill this gap.

3 Data and Methodology

Our empirical analysis is based on individual survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS). The ESS surveys are carried out every two years in around 30 countries in Europe and its neighborhood (not all countries feature in every wave). They follow a unified methodology and use the same basic questionnaire (while allowing for country-specific questions). The surveys address a wide range issues such as media exposure, political interest and participation, economic, political and social attitudes, and collect also detailed information on socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and their households. Importantly, the ESSs include retrospective questions on the respondents' voting behavior in the most recent election. For our analysis, we are interested in the electoral preferences of Turkish voters at the time of AKP's

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[4] Appendix C summarizes the main contributions to the literature.

rise to power in 2002. Therefore, we use ESS waves 2 (collected in 2004) and 4 (2008), which contain information on past voting behavior in the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively.

The ESS typically features 1-2 thousand respondents per country per wave; we have 1156 observations with information on voting behavior in the 2nd wave and 1304 in the 4th wave. The dependent variable equals to 1 if the respondent voted for the party in question in the last election and zero otherwise. We consider the two main parties, the AKP and the CHP: these were the only two parties to be represented in the parliament following the 2002 election (they were joined by the Nationalist Movement Party, MHP, as well as by a number of independent MPs, in 2007). These two political parties together received approximately 54% and 68% of total votes in the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively (see Appendix B).[5] They represent two contrasting political views: the AKP is a right-wing and religious party while the CHP represents the left-wing side of the spectrum and espouses largely secular values.

We include a number of explanatory variables which capture socio-economic characteristics of the respondents: age, gender, number of years of education, marital status, household composition, urban vs rural residence, economic situation of the household, labor-market status of the respondent during the preceding week, belonging to an ethnic minority (which, in Turkey, mainly captures the Kurds[6]), and religiosity. Detailed explanations of these variables are in Appendix A. The regressions are estimated using the logit model.

4 Empirical Results

We estimate regressions relating voting for AKP and CHP to the respondents' socio-economic characteristics including gender, age, years of education, labor-market participation, place of residence, living with husband/wife/partner, having children in the household, belonging to an ethnic minority and subjective perception about the household's income. To control for the effect of religiosity on voting behavior, we add a set of dummy variables that capture how often the respondent prays (results with self-reported degree of religiosity are very similar). All of the regressions are estimated for both genders together as well as for male and female respondents separately.

Table 2 shows the determinants of support for the AKP,with socio-economic variables only (i.e. without religiosity). The first three models show the results of regressions estimated with the

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[5] The regression results for other parties are available upon request.
[6] No further information is available in the ESS on the ethnic identity of those respondents who declare to belong to an ethnic minority.

ESS 2 data set, while the last three models show the results based on ESS 4, corresponding to the 2002 and 2007 elections, respectively. Gender does not have an effect on the support for AKP in either the 2002 or 2007 election (see columns 1 and 4). Few of the remaining variables (age, living with husband/wife/partner, place of residence and belonging to an ethnic minority) are statistically significant. However, an important difference appears with respect to education when we consider male and female votes in 2002 separately. The effect of education is hump-shaped for males: more years of formal education initially translate into greater support for AKP, before the effect levels off and becomes negative. The maximum effect is attained at just over 5 years of education, which, in Turkey, is equivalent to completed primary education. The effect for women, in contrast, is effectively negative throughout: it is u-shaped but the minimum is attained at 19 years (post-graduate level), which very few women possess.

Figure 1 depicts the distribution of education, by year, for men and women. Women are more represented at the bottom of the distribution: staggering 19 percent report to have no education at all, compared to 7 percent of men. Most respondents, 39 percent of men and women alike, completed only primary education. Middle school, which requires further 3 years, was not compulsory until 1997[7], so that many ESS respondents finished their education when only 5 years of schooling was mandatory. The next smaller peak, at 11 years, corresponds to completed high school, a level that is attained by 15% of males and 12% of females in our data. Only relatively few attain more than high-school education, with university (at 15 years) completed by 4% of men and 3% of women. This, effectively, means that nearly 50% of men and some 65% of women in Turkey have between 0 and 5 years of education. In other words, the divergent effect of education on voting behavior of male and female voters affects a large share of Turkish voters.

The different relationship between education and support for AKP among low-skilled men and women may stem from the fact that men with low level of education can potentially benefit from low-skilled women being excluded from the labor market, as may happen if Islamic social norms become more prevalent in Turkey. Therefore, such men could expect to see their labor-market outcomes improving under an AKP government. Women, whether low skilled or high skilled, in contrast, stand to gain little, as far as their labor-market position is concerned, from voting for the AKP.

Interestingly, the aforementioned effect of education can only be observed during the 2002 election. In 2007, education has a negative effect on all voters (and, in unreported regression

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[7] In 2012, compulsory education was further extended to 12 years.

with education featuring linearly, on males and females too); it does not have a different effect on the men's and women's votes for AKP. Seemingly, once the AKP assumed power, the voting behavior of males and females voters has converged. A possible explanation could be based on the fact that the rise of AKP did not translate into a permanent fall in employment of women, as the aforementioned statistics presented in Table 1 document.

Table 3 shows the results for the AKP support, when we explain voting behavior with both socio-economic variables and religiosity. Specifically, we use a question on how often respondents pray; the answers to this question are summarized in Figure 2. Clearly, Turkey is a very religious society, with 65 percent of men and 77 percent of women claiming to pray every day. Nevertheless, we observe some change over time, with the share of those who pray every day falling slightly between 2004 and 2008 while the shares of those praying only on religious holy days rises (these figures are available upon request).

The regression results with religiosity are very similar to the previous results. As it is expected, people's attitude about religion is one of the most significant determinants of voting for the AKP: respondents who pray rarely or never do not vote for AKP. As in the previous regressions, the gender dummy does not have an effect on the votes for AKP. Hence, taking into account religiosity does not change the results in respect to the gender gap in voting behavior. The differentiated effect of the quadratic polynomial of education, nevertheless, occurs also when controlling for religiosity. The pattern for men is again hump-shaped while that for women is u-shaped, with the respective turning points attained at almost identical education levels as in the preceding analysis without religiosity.

Tables 4 and 5 show the results for the CHP. Again, we first consider only socio-economic variables and then add religiosity. As in Tables 2 and 3, the first three models show the results of regressions estimated by using ESS 2, while the last three models show the results of regressions estimated using ESS 4.

Similar to the analysis for AKP, education plays an important role in determining support for the CHP. For men and women together, the effect of education is positive. When considering the two genders separately, the pattern for males is u-shaped while that for females is hump-shaped, the reverse of the results for the AKP. The lowest support among males is attained at just under 6 years of education. For females, the maximum is at over 11 years of formal education (equivalent to a high-school diploma). The pattern is very similar again when we add religiosity.

As with the AKP support, the differentiated effect of education disappears in the 2007 election. Nevertheless, gender does appear as a statistically significant determinant of voting for the CHP

in the 2007 election: males are significantly less likely to vote for this party than females. This indicates that a gender gap in voting for CHP appeared in that year, in contrast to 2002. Since the CHP is a center-left party and tends to support redistributive policies, this result is compatible with the view that women generally advocate egalitarian attitudes and vote for leftist parties. Finally, respondents who rarely or never pray are significantly more likely to vote for the CHP. Thus, with the AKP, religiosity is an important determinant of voting for the CHP.

In summary; education and religiosity are the most important determinants of voting for both AKP and CHP. Moreover, the effect of education on voting behavior is different for males and females in an important way in the 2002 election. In contrast, religiosity affects the voting behavior of men and women in the same way. Furthermore, there is a gender gap between men and women in terms of voting for the CHP in 2007, with women more likely to vote for this party than men.

5 Conclusions

The differences between the voting behavior of men and women have become one of the most controversial issues in political-behavior research in recent years. Although there are quite a number of studies on the gender gap in voting behavior in developed countries, almost none of the analyses investigate this phenomenon in the context of developing or Muslim countries.

In this study, we examine the voting behavior of Turkish voters in the 2002 and 2007 elections, which heralded and cemented, respectively, the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). We are particularly interested in the differences between the voting behavior of male and female voters, given that Islamic cultural and social norms impose important restrictions on the behavior of both genders, with the restrictions on women's behavior rather more onerous. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive analysis of gender differences in voting behavior in Turkey, and one of only few for Muslim countries in general.

According to our results, education and religiosity are both important determinants of men's and women's votes. While religiosity affects the votes of men and women in the same way, the effect of education differs with respect to gender. In particular, we find that the support for the AKP among female voters falls with increasing education while the pattern for males is non-monotonic, rising first, peaking around the equivalent of primary education (5 years of schooling) and only then falling. The support for the main opposition party, the Republican People's Party (CHP), is the opposite, hump-shaped for women and u-shaped for men, with almost the same turning point for men as in the case of the AKP support. It is striking that this

pattern only prevails in the 2002 election; in the subsequent 2007 election, education shows a negative (positive) effect on the votes for the AKP (CHP) for both men and women alike. Instead, a standard gender gap appears in the 2007 election, with female voters more likely to vote for the CHP than males.

We believe our results reflect two kinds of distributional effects of greater application of traditional Islamic norms in the society: it strengthens the position of men at the expense of women, and it imposes more restrictions on the quality of life and consumption options of highly educated individuals (who tend to be more Westernized) than on those of less educated. The different effect of education on male and female voting behavior in 2002 may be driven by the first of these two effects. In particular, low-skilled men may have expected to benefit from restrictions being placed on labor-market participation by women (who are on average less skilled than men in Turkey). Hence, the rise of political Islam in Turkey may have been assisted by gender conflict in the labor market. Female labor force participation indeed fell from 2002 to 2005 (see Table 1). However, this trend proved only temporary and female participation started rising again from 2006 onwards. The fact that the AKP did not significantly restrict women's participation in the labor market may explain why the hump-shaped effect of education on men's voting behavior only appears in 2002 and not in 2007. In the latter election, instead, the second effect of Islamization seems to dominate.

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Figure 1 Years of education by gender

Notes: Primary education comprises 5 years and is compulsory. Middle school is completed at 8 years (and has been compulsory since 1997). 11 years corresponds to completed high school and 15 years is an undergraduate degree.

Figure 2 Religiosity

Notes: Responses to the question "How often pray apart from at religious services." The possible answers were every day (1), more than once a week (2), once a week (3), at least once a month (4), only on special holy days (5), less often (6), and never (7).

Table 1 Basic Statistics, Turkey

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Unemployment	7.7	6.5	8.4	10.4	10.5	10.8	10.6	10.2	10.3	11	14	11.9	9.8	9.2	10
LF Participation Rate [15-64]	54.3	51.5	51.3	51.2	49.9	49.2	49.4	49.3	49.4	50.2	51.3	52.4	53.4	53.5	53.5
LF Participation Rate [15-64 Males]	78.4	76.1	75.3	74.2	72.9	74.3	74.7	74.2	74.2	74.7	75.3	75.5	76.3	75.6	75.6
LF Participation Rate [15-64 Females]	31.3	27.9	28.4	29.3	28	25.2	25.2	25.6	25.6	26.7	28.4	30.2	31.5	32.2	32.2
GDP growth	-3.4	6.8	-5.7	6.2	5.3	9.4	8.4	6.9	4.7	0.7	-4.8	9.2	8.8	2.1	4.2
GDP pc growth	-4.8	5.2	-7.1	4.6	3.8	7.9	7.0	5.6	3.4	-0.5	-6.1	7.6	7.5	0.9	2.9

Table 2 Determinants of Voting for AKP

Variables	ESS Wave 2 (2004)			ESS Wave 4 (2008)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)
Male	0.0587			0.0661		
	(0.0535)			(0.0533)		
Age	-0.0143***	-0.0143	-0.0120	-0.0022	-0.0053	0.0093
	(0.0071)	(0.0116)	(0.0099)	(0.0065)	(0.0110)	(0.0088)
Age sqrd	0.0001*	0.0002	0.0001	0.00002	0.00009	-0.00010
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Education years	-0.0086	0.0492**	-0.0344**	-0.0275**	-0.0183	-0.0255
	(0.0127)	(0.0236)	(0.0161)	(0.0133)	(0.0225)	(0.0174)
Education years sqrd	-0.0010	-0.0046***	0.0009	-0.0007	-0.0014	-0.0008
	(0.0008)	(0.0014)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)
Household size	-0.0034	0.0043	-0.0088	0.0061	-0.0162	0.0291*
	(0.0097)	(0.0148)	(0.0133)	(0.0104)	(0.0157)	(0.0163)
Children (dummy)	0.0576	-0.0037	0.1059*	0.0226	0.0342	0.0136
	(0.0434)	(0.0691)	(0.0581)	(0.0396)	(0.0627)	(0.0530)
Married/cohabitating	0.1138**	0.1583**	0.1145*	0.0148	-0.0545	0.0376
	(0.0458)	(0.0784)	(0.0627)	(0.0451)	(0.0822)	(0.0557)
Suburb of city[1]	-0.1852***	-0.2632**	-0.1176	-0.0702	0.0014	-0.1309
	(0.0654)	(0.1145)	(0.0827)	(0.0666)	(0.1040)	(0.0868)
Town[1]	-0.0627	-0.0639	-0.0625	-0.0388	-0.0558	-0.0362
	(0.0422)	(0.0637)	(0.0587)	(0.0499)	(0.0791)	(0.0657)
Village[1]	0.0365	-0.0530	0.1247**	-0.0522	-0.1119*	0.0069
	(0.0424)	(0.0612)	(0.0621)	(0.0396)	(0.0579)	(0.0574)
Farm/countryside[1]	-0.2883	-0.3427	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.3032)	(0.3085)				
Income: coping[2]	0.0405	0.0034	0.0741	-0.0536	-0.1881**	0.0544
	(0.0590)	(0.0948)	(0.0805)	(0.0643)	(0.0958)	(0.0884)
Income: difficult[2]	0.0077	-0.0924	0.0914	-0.0399	-0.1509	0.0445
	(0.0641)	(0.1034)	(0.0868)	(0.0671)	(0.1015)	(0.0913)
Income: v.difficult [2]	-0.0114	-0.1069	0.0293	-0.0945	-0.2385**	0.0249
	(0.0700)	(0.1140)	(0.0941)	(0.0729)	(0.1098)	(0.1002)
Paid work[3]	0.0174	0.0350	-0.0247	0.0243	-0.0026	0.0934
	(0.0677)	(0.0844)	(0.1277)	(0.0951)	(0.1200)	(0.1662)
Student[3]	-0.0174	-0.1499	0.1597	0.0315	0.0125	0.0462
	(0.1319)	(0.1818)	(0.2194)	(0.1293)	(0.1731)	(0.2074)
Unemployed[3]	-0.0035	0.0268	0.0373	0.0650	0.0758	0.1947
	(0.0922)	(0.1110)	(0.2264)	(0.1044)	(0.1304)	(0.2000)
Inactive[3]	0.0175	0.2028	-0.1620	0.0187	-0.0018	0.0191
	(0.0989)	(0.1419)	(0.1575)	(0.1144)	(0.1419)	(0.2167)
Sick/disabled[3]	0.2783	0.3099	0 (omitted)	-0.2144	-0.0571	0 (omitted)
	(0.2188)	(0.2392)		(0.2689)	(0.3528)	
Retired[3]	0.1244	0.0704	0.1462	-0.0671	-0.1439	-0.0924
	(0.0765)	(0.0993)	(0.1503)	(0.0998)	(0.1272)	(0.1838)
Homeworker[3]	0.1139	0.4798**	0.0473	0.1110	-0.1400	0.1154
	(0.0717)	(0.2111)	(0.1034)	(0.0999)	(0.3845)	(0.1550)
Ethnic minority	-0.1780***	-0.1157	-0.2463***	-0.1906***	-0.1910**	-0.1908**
	(0.0599)	(0.0909)	(0.0845)	(0.0613)	(0.0878)	(0.0895)

Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p < 0.01: **p < 0.05 *p< 0.10. Omitted categories:

(1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity.

Table 3 Determinants of Voting for AKP (with religiosity)

	ESS Wave 2 (2004)			ESS Wave 4 (2008)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Variables	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)
Male	0.0764			0.0641		
	(0.0548)			(0.0546)		
Age	-0.0155**	-0.0138	-0.0140	-0.0006	0.0041	0.0070
	(0.0073)	(0.0119)	(0.0101)	(0.0067)	(0.0113)	(0.0090)
Age sqrd	0.0001*	0.0001	0.0001	0.0000	0.0000	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Education years	-0.0128	0.0453*	-0.0364**	-0.0302**	-0.0236	-0.0265
	(0.0128)	(0.0238)	(0.0163)	(0.0137)	(0.0234)	(0.0178)
Education years sqrd	-0.0007	-0.0043***	0.0009	-0.0006	-0.0012	-0.0007
	(0.0008)	(0.0014)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)
Household size	-0.0027	0.0032	-0.0061	0.0023	-0.0236	0.0260
	(0.0098)	(0.0152)	(0.0135)	(0.0107)	(0.0166)	(0.0166)
Children (dummy)	0.0461	-0.0068	0.0806	0.0362	0.0292	0.0501
	(0.0440)	(0.0708)	(0.0592)	(0.0407)	(0.0656)	(0.0547)
Married/cohabitating	0.1122**	0.1467*	0.1266**	0.0015	-0.1057	0.0347
	(0.0464)	(0.0810)	(0.0637)	(0.0467)	(0.0882)	(0.0573)
Suburb of city[1]	-0.1977***	-0.2803**	-0.1270	-0.0929	0.0018	-0.1646*
	(0.0661)	(0.1153)	(0.0838)	(0.0684)	(0.1074)	(0.0907)
Town[1]	-0.0552	-0.0571	-0.0730	-0.0471	-0.0718	-0.0337
	(0.0433)	(0.0669)	(0.0600)	(0.0510)	(0.0822)	(0.0665)
Village[1]	0.0301	-0.0692	0.1111*	-0.0487	-0.1490**	0.0349
	(0.0430)	(0.0627)	(0.0634)	(0.0410)	(0.0611)	(0.0598)
Farm/countryside[1]	-0.2937	-0.3552	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.3075)	(0.3164)				
Income: coping[2]	0.0625	0.0201	0.0837	-0.0568	-0.1863*	0.0436
	(0.0592)	(0.0954)	(0.0816)	(0.0665)	(0.1006)	(0.0909)
Income: difficult[2]	0.0289	-0.0753	0.0982	-0.0445	-0.1374	0.0351
	(0.0645)	(0.1049)	(0.0880)	(0.0693)	(0.1072)	(0.0936)
Income: v. difficult [2]	0.0066	-0.0946	0.0329	-0.0939	-0.2426**	0.0303
	(0.0703)	(0.1156)	(0.0952)	(0.0751)	(0.1148)	(0.1031)
Paid work[3]	0.0308	0.0581	0.0022	0.0333	0.0153	0.0760
	(0.0694)	(0.0877)	(0.1300)	(0.0977)	(0.1225)	(0.1740)
Student[3]	0.0107	-0.0846	0.1333	0.1137	0.1274	0.0954
	(0.1374)	(0.1913)	(0.2211)	(0.1339)	(0.1806)	(0.2166)
Unemployed[3]	0.0253	0.0717	0.0930	0.0639	0.0792	0.1638
	(0.0954)	(0.1159)	(0.2416)	(0.1069)	(0.1333)	(0.2065)
Inactive[3]	0.0514	0.2601*	-0.1216	0.0254	0.0302	-0.0134
	(0.1015)	(0.1481)	(0.1610)	(0.1184)	(0.1488)	(0.2225)
Sick/disabled[3]	0.2748	0.3117	0 (omitted)	-0.2197	-0.0083	0 (omitted)
	(0.2200)	(0.2410)		(0.2739)	(0.3649)	
Retired[3]	0.1344*	0.0860	0.1789	-0.0737	-0.1478	-0.1034
	(0.0776)	(0.1005)	(0.1522)	(0.1025)	(0.1301)	(0.1917)
Homeworker[3]	0.1235*	0.5446**	0.0642	0.1136	-0.1082	0.0880
	(0.0728)	(0.2320)	(0.1052)	(0.1030)	(0.3812)	(0.1636)
Ethnic minority	-0.1869***	-0.1123	-0.2670***	-0.1905***	-0.1479	-0.2010**
	(0.0611)	(0.0930)	(0.0859)	(0.0645)	(0.0980)	(0.0916)
Pray more than once per week	-0.0468	-0.1005	0.0106	-0.0786	-0.0814	-0.0877
	(0.0546)	(0.0719)	(0.0915)	(0.0541)	(0.0713)	(0.0886)
Pray once per week	-0.0240	-0.0039	-0.0675	-0.1267*	-0.1865**	-0.1057
	(0.0730)	(0.0922)	(0.1321)	(0.0710)	(0.0946)	(0.1137)
Pray at least once a month	-0.1224	-0.1542	-0.1118	0.05787	0.0876	0.0741
	(0.1221)	(0.1566)	(0.2153)	(0.1002)	(0.1564)	(0.1316)
Pray only on Special holidays	-0.0929	0.12160	-0.4505	-0.1480**	-0.3948***	-0.0336
	(0.1366)	(0.1938)	(0.2774)	(0.0752)	(0.1398)	(0.0959)
Pray less often	-0.4251***	-0.3625**	-0.4856**	-0.2452**	-0.5845**	-0.1363
	(0.1180)	(0.1521)	(0.1976)	(0.1211)	(0.2715)	(0.1456)
Pray never	-0.3683***	-0.4190**	-0.3363	-0.5058***	-0.6107***	-0.4303***
	(0.1301)	(0.1694)	(0.2253)	(0.1088)	(0.1964)	(0.1333)

Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p < 0.01: **p < 0.05 *p< 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity.

Table 4 Determinants of Voting for CHP

	ESS Wave 2 (2004)			ESS Wave 4 (2008)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Variables	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)
Male	-0.0475			-0.0689**		
	(0.0305)			(0.0327)		
Age	0.0104**	0.0130*	0.0053	0.0094**	0.0223***	-0.0005
	(0.0046)	(0.0074)	(0.0058)	(0.0047)	(0.0084)	(0.0057)
Age sqrd	-0.0001*	-0.0001*	-0.00002	-0.0001	-0.00022***	0.00003
	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Education years	0.0159**	-0.0137	0.0285***	0.0190**	-0.0020	0.0217*
	(0.0078)	(0.0131)	(0.0097)	(0.0094)	(0.0157)	(0.0115)
Education years sqrd	-0.0004	0.0012*	-0.0013**	0.0001	0.0011	0.0001
	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0009)	(0.0007)
Household size	-0.0101	-0.0030	-0.0167*	-0.0154*	0.0006	-0.0312**
	(0.0072)	(0.0098)	(0.0098)	(0.0088)	(0.0118)	(0.0126)
Children (dummy)	-0.0273	0.0341	-0.0580*	0.0079	-0.0197	0.0261
	(0.0271)	(0.0437)	(0.0325)	(0.0279)	(0.0426)	(0.0356)
Married/cohabitating	-0.0354	-0.0954**	0.0041	-0.0407	-0.0510	-0.0415
	(0.0270)	(0.0460)	(0.0339)	(0.0288)	(0.0533)	(0.0338)
Suburb of city[1]	-0.0729	-0.0794	-0.0798	-0.0872	-0.0102	-0.1520*
	(0.0499)	(0.0830)	(0.0559)	(0.0588)	(0.0768)	(0.0903)
Town[1]	-0.0105	0.0012	-0.0198	-0.0556	-0.0335	-0.0519
	(0.0253)	(0.0362)	(0.0325)	(0.0374)	(0.0577)	(0.0473)
Village[1]	-0.0457	-0.0080	-0.0792**	0.0314	0.0556	0.0025
	(0.0274)	(0.0366)	(0.0381)	(0.0274)	(0.0396)	(0.0380)
Farm/countryside[1]	0.0922	0.0948	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.1374)	(0.1349)				
Income: coping[2]	0.0489	0.1015	0.0152	0.0040	0.0754	-0.0396
	(0.0381)	(0.0623)	(0.0461)	(0.0395)	(0.0643)	(0.0489)
Income: difficult[2]	0.0204	0.0466	0.0083	-0.0005	0.1012	-0.0647
	(0.0425)	(0.0701)	(0.0505)	(0.0424)	(0.0688)	(0.0521)
Income: v.difficult[2]	0.0936**	0.1424**	0.0804	0.0173	0.0773	-0.0136
	(0.0443)	(0.0715)	(0.0538)	(0.0475)	(0.0763)	(0.0588)
Paid work[3]	0.0191	-0.0257	0.1063	0.0089	0.0153	-0.0113
	(0.0429)	(0.0512)	(0.0709)	(0.0649)	(0.0811)	(0.1106)
Student[3]	0.0302	0.0668	0.0075	-0.0638	-0.0569	-0.0573
	(0.0705)	(0.0816)	(0.1315)	(0.0888)	(0.1254)	(0.1293)
Unemployed[3]	0.0337	-0.0107	0.0755	-0.0861	-0.0991	-0.0911
	(0.0560)	(0.0645)	(0.1070)	(0.0771)	(0.0947)	(0.1412)
Inactive[3]	0.0225	-0.0615	0.1158	-0.0100	-0.0047	-0.0368
	(0.0633)	(0.0945)	(0.0842)	(0.0794)	(0.0946)	(0.1645)
Sick/disabled[3]	0.0079	0.0287	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.1278)	(0.1329)				
Retired[3]	-0.0188	0.0300	-0.0446	-0.0090	0.0008	0.0197
	(0.0472)	(0.0610)	(0.0834)	(0.0675)	(0.0852)	(0.1158)
Homeworker[3]	-0.0146	-0.0854	0.0397	-0.0528	0 (omitted)	-0.0145
	(0.0453)	(0.1224)	(0.0624)	(0.0669)		(0.1042)
Ethnic minority	-0.0375	-0.1038	0.0314	-0.0259	-0.1470*	0.0684
	(0.0434)	(0.0692)	(0.0524)	(0.0475)	(0.0828)	(0.0583)

Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p < 0.01: **p < 0.05 *p< 0.10. Omitted categories: (1) Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity.

Table 5 Determinants of Voting for CHP (with religiosity)

	ESS Wave 2 (2004)			ESS Wave 4 (2008)		
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Variables	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)	(Both genders)	(Males)	(Females)
Male	-0.0711**			-0.0746**		
	(0.0301)			(0.0323)		
Age	0.0111**	0.0117	0.0092	0.0072	0.0136*	0.0012
	(0.0044)	(0.0074)	(0.0056)	(0.0046)	(0.0079)	(0.0055)
Age sqrd	-0.0001*	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001	0.0000
	(0.00004)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Education years	0.0188**	-0.0121	0.0296***	0.0208**	0.0026	0.0195*
	(0.0076)	(0.0133)	(0.0092)	(0.0094)	(0.0151)	(0.0115)
Education years sqrd	-0.0006	0.0010	-0.0013**	-0.0001	0.0007	0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)
Household size	-0.0103	-0.0035	-0.0184**	-0.0110	0.0060	-0.0274**
	(0.0070)	(0.0096)	(0.0092)	(0.0086)	(0.0115)	(0.0124)
Children (dummy)	-0.0146	0.0500	-0.0343	-0.0064	-0.0087	-0.0096
	(0.0265)	(0.0447)	(0.0308)	(0.0273)	(0.0412)	(0.0357)
Married/cohabitating	-0.0316	-0.0981**	-0.0076	-0.0304	-0.0375	-0.0358
	(0.0264)	(0.0487)	(0.0319)	(0.0284)	(0.0509)	(0.0334)
Suburb of city[1]	-0.0655	-0.0775	-0.0650	-0.0714	-0.0070	-0.1319
	(0.0490)	(0.0832)	(0.0524)	(0.0563)	(0.0732)	(0.0858)
Town[1]	-0.0146	0.0029	-0.0163	-0.0448	-0.0272	-0.0421
	(0.0249)	(0.0370)	(0.0306)	(0.0365)	(0.0549)	(0.0458)
Village[1]	-0.0352	0.0063	-0.0591*	0.0330	0.0765**	-0.0148
	(0.0267)	(0.0369)	(0.0355)	(0.0274)	(0.0388)	(0.0387)
Farm/countryside[1]	0.0797	0.0704	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.1398)	(0.1421)				
Income: coping[2]	0.0358	0.0928	0.0050	-0.0145	0.0687	-0.0583
	(0.0373)	(0.0627)	(0.0433)	(0.0399)	(0.0653)	(0.0486)
Income: difficult[2]	0.0083	0.0394	-0.0094	-0.0162	0.0921	-0.0788
	(0.0416)	(0.0708)	(0.0479)	(0.0424)	(0.0693)	(0.0515)
Income: v.difficult [2]	0.0782*	0.1229*	0.0761	-0.0035	0.0784	-0.0396
	(0.0434)	(0.0721)	(0.0507)	(0.0475)	(0.0765)	(0.0585)
Paid work[3]	0.0078	-0.0397	0.0866	0.0007	-0.0099	0.0452
	(0.0416)	(0.0510)	(0.0680)	(0.0683)	(0.0794)	(0.1295)
Student[3]	0.0134	0.0233	0.0390	-0.1394	-0.1591	-0.0847
	(0.0712)	(0.0854)	(0.1234)	(0.0921)	(0.1226)	(0.1460)
Unemployed[3]	0.0112	-0.0249	0.0337	-0.0819	-0.1118	-0.0232
	(0.0550)	(0.0650)	(0.1016)	(0.0798)	(0.0932)	(0.1556)
Inactive[3]	-0.0040	-0.1079	0.1115	-0.0290	-0.0487	-0.0005
	(0.0618)	(0.0957)	(0.0794)	(0.0823)	(0.0942)	(0.1755)
Sick/disabled[3]	0.0199	0.0280	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)	0 (omitted)
	(0.1225)	(0.1305)				
Retired[3]	-0.0241	0.0192	-0.0776	0.0056	-0.0030	0.0736
	(0.0456)	(0.0603)	(0.0799)	(0.0707)	(0.0835)	(0.1348)
Homeworker[3]	-0.0238	-0.1025	0.0374	-0.0510	0 (omitted)	0.0545
	(0.0435)	(0.1202)	(0.0597)	(0.0705)		(0.1267)
Ethnic minority	-0.0318	-0.1057	0.0588	-0.0395	-0.2169***	0.0744
	(0.0427)	(0.0695)	(0.0483)	(0.0479)	(0.0829)	(0.0560)
Pray more than once per week	0.0555*	0.0475	0.0749*	0.1208***	0.1084***	0.1211**
	(0.0322)	(0.0420)	(0.0440)	(0.0330)	(0.0408)	(0.0524)
Pray once per week	0.07415*	0.0164	0.1568***	0.1090**	0.1165**	0.0897
	(0.0404)	(0.0558)	(0.0554)	(0.0420)	(0.0551)	(0.0630)
Pray at least once a month	0.1425**	0.1264*	0.1191	0.0458	-0.0752	0.0952
	(0.0558)	(0.0698)	(0.0889)	(0.0655)	(0.1301)	(0.0748)
Pray only on Special holidays	0.0958	0 (omitted)	0.2445***	0.1113***	0.1949***	0.0655
	(0.0720)		(0.0926)	(0.0435)	(0.0690)	(0.0529)
Pray less often	0.14051***	0.0780	0.1732***	0.1982***	0.2947***	0.1625**
	(0.0470)	(0.0684)	(0.0598)	(0.0606)	(0.0996)	(0.0761)
Pray never	0.1958***	0.1598***	0.2259**	0.3008***	0.3042***	0.2832***
	(0.0493)	(0.0603)	(0.0890)	(0.0485)	(0.0703)	(0.0651)

Marginal effects, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***p < 0.01: **p < 0.05 *p< 0.10. Omitted categories: (1)

Resident in big city; (2) comfortable with current income; (3) last 7 days any other activity.

Appendix A

Descriptions of Independent Variables in the Empirical Analysis

Name	Description
Male	The gender of respondent: 1 if male and 0 if female.
Age	Age of respondent
Education years	Number of the years of education
Household size	Number of household members
Children	Children present in the household (dummy)
Married/cohabitating	Respondent lives with husband/wife/partner
Place of residence	Place of residence, respondent's description: 1: A big city (omitted category), 2: Suburbs or outskirts of big city, 3: Town or small city, 4: Country village, 5: Farm or home in countryside
Income	Feeling about household's income nowadays: 1: Living comfortably on present income (omitted category), 2: Coping on present income, 3: Difficult on present income, 4: Very difficult on present income
Paid work	Doing last 7 days; paid work
Student	Doing last 7 days; education
Unemployed	Doing last 7 days; actively looking for a job
Inactive	Doing last 7 days; not actively looking for a job
Sick/disabled	Doing last 7 days; permanently sick or disabled
Retired	Doing last 7 days; retired
Homeworker	Doing last 7 days; housework, looking after children, others
Ethnic	Belong to ethnic minority group in country
Pray	How often pray apart from religious services; 1: Everyday (omitted category), 2: More than once a week, 3: Once a week, 4: At least once a month, 5: Only on special holidays, 6: Less often, 7: Never

Appendix B

The Results of 2002 and 2007 Turkish Elections

	2002	2007
Number of registered voters	41407027	42799303
Number of Actual Voters	32768161	36056293
Turnout Rate (%)	79.1	84.2
Vote Shares of Political Parties		
Justice and Development Party (AKP)	34.3	46.6
Motherland Party (ANAP)	5.1	---
Great Union Party (BBP)	1.0	---
Republican People's Party (CHP)	19.4	20.9
Democratic People's Party (DEHAP)	6.2	---
Democratic Left Party (DSP)	1.2	---
True Path Party (DYP)	9.5	---
Virtue Party (FP)	---	---
Young Party (GP)	7.2	3.0
Nationalist Action Party (MHP)	8.4	14.3
Felicity Party (SP)	2.5	2.3
New Turkey Party (YTP)	1.2	---
Country Party (YT)	0.9	---
Independents	1.0	5.2
Other	2.0	7.7

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute**,** Justice and Election Statistics, 2013, www.tuik.gov.tr

Appendix C

Studies Examining the Gender Gap in Political Attitudes

Study	Coverage and Data	Findings
Hayes (1997)	UK (1992 British Election Survey)	Gender does not have an impact on votes. Feminism explains party choice.
Chaney et al. (1998)	US (1980, 1984, 1988, 1992 National Election Studies)	The main determinants of the gender gap are economic conditions, social programs, military action, abortion and ideology.
Studlar et al. (1998)	Australia, UK, US (1993 Australian Election Survey, 1992 British Election Survey, 1992 American National Election Survey)	In Australia and the UK, socioeconomic and situational factors (women's adult responsibilities) explain the gender gap. In the US, political factors have much more effect on the gender gap.
Kaufmann and Petroick (1999)	US (1992, 1996 National Election Surveys)	Gender gap results from the changing partisanship of men. Differences in social welfare opinions may be the main contributor to the gender gap.
Inglehart and Norris (2000)	60 countries (World Values Survey Data over the period 1980s and 1990s)	In postindustrial countries modern gender gap persists while in developing countries traditional gender gap prevails.
Howell and Day (2000)	US (1996 National Election Study)	Egalitarian attitudes of women, their cultural roles and education are the main determinants of the gender gap.
Knutsen (2001)	Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Election Surveys from 1970s to 1990s)	Gender has an important effect on voting behavior. Different sector employment (public versus private) explains part of the gender gap.

Appendix C (continued)

Study	Coverage and Data	Findings
Kaufmann (2002)	US (National Election Studies from 1988 to 2000)	Reproductive rights, female equality, legal protection for homosexuals are increasingly significant determinants of party identification for women.
Edlund and Pande (2002)	US (National Election Studies, March Current Population Surveys over the period 1964-1996)	Strong positive correlation between divorce prevalence and the gender gap.
Brooks et al. (2006)	Australia, Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, UK and US (International Social Cleavages and Politics (ISCP) Data Set over the period 1964-1998)	With the exception of the US, gender is not statistically significant variable for explaining the voting behavior.
Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006)	Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, UK and US (1996 International Social Survey Program Data)	In countries with high divorce rates, working women vote for left parties.
Bergh (2007)	Netherlands, Norway, US (1996 National Election Study for the US, 1996 Euro Barometer Data for the Netherlands and Citizenship Survey from 2000 for Norway)	In the US and in Norway, there is a strong effect of feminist consciousness on the gender gap.
Giger (2009)	12 Western Europe countries (Euro Barometer, Eurostat, OECD, Abramson and Inglehart (1995), Huber et al. (2004) Data Sets over the period 1974-2000)	In 1976 and 1985, women tended to vote more for conservative parties while in 2000 they have given higher support to leftist parties. The main determinant of the modern gender gap is the increasing labor force participation of women.
Finseraas et al. (2012)	Norway	There is a gender gap in political preferences. However, it cannot be explained by the risk of women's divorce.