American Economic Review: Insights
ISSN 2640-205X (Print) | ISSN 2640-2068 (Online)
Sequential Sampling by Individuals and Groups: An Experimental Study
American Economic Review: Insights
(pp. 480–96)
Abstract
Many committees—juries, political task forces, etc.—spend time gathering costly information before reaching a decision. We report results from lab experiments focused on such dynamic information-collection processes, as in sequential hypothesis testing. We consider decisions governed by individuals and groups and compare how voting rules affect outcomes. Several insights emerge. First, average decision accuracies approximate those predicted theoretically, but these accuracies decline over time: Participants display nonstationary behavior. Second, groups generate markedly different outcomes than individuals, with majority rule yielding faster and less accurate decisions. In particular, welfare is higher when sequential information is collected in groups using unanimity.Citation
Reshidi, Pëllumb, Alessandro Lizzeri, Leeat Yariv, Jimmy Chan, and Wing Suen. 2025. "Sequential Sampling by Individuals and Groups: An Experimental Study." American Economic Review: Insights 7 (4): 480–96. DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20240055Additional Materials
JEL Classification
- C83 Survey Methods; Sampling Methods
- D71 Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- D72 Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness