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  5. Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains

American Economic Journal:
Microeconomics

ISSN 1945-7669 (Print) | ISSN 1945-7685 (Online)

Optimal Voting Mechanisms on Generalized Single-Peaked Domains

  • Tobias Rachidi
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (Forthcoming)

Abstract

This paper studies the design of voting mechanisms. There are multiple alternatives, and the voters have generalized single-peaked preferences derived from median spaces as introduced in Nehring and Puppe (2007b). This class of preferences covers a wide range of economically relevant domains, and it is much larger than the well-known single-peaked preferences on a line. I characterize the welfare-maximizing voting rules among all social choice functions satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and surjectivity. The optimal mechanisms are composed of binary votes on subsets of alternatives involving flexible majority requirements.

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