Online Appendix

Can Development Programs Counter Insurgencies? Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

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Section 1: Tables

Table A.1: Comparison of Study Sample with Representative Sample of Afghanistan's Rural Population

Indicator	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2007-08			Midline Survey			t-statistic
	Mean	S.E.	Obs.	Mean	S.E.	Obs.	
Age of Male Respondent	43.067	13.979	16143	42.682	15.532	4660	-1.613
Income from Primary Source (*Afghanis*)	54,124	51,459	16,065	58,618	77,930	4,554	4.588
Household Engaged in Agriculture	0.806	0.395	16,143	0.723	0.448	4,625	-12.336
Access to Electricity	0.278	0.448	16,141	0.330	0.47	4,662	6.897
Last Child Born is Alive	0.992	0.088	9,861	0.975	0.157	1,736	-6.643
Last Birth Delivered at Home	0.874	0.332	9,817	0.892	0.31	1,743	2.146
Last Birth Delivered in Hospital	0.064	0.244	9,817	0.036	0.187	1,743	-4.492

Table A.2: Composition and Coverage of NSP Impact Evaluation Surveys

	Baseline Survey (September 2007)	Midline Survey (May -October 2009)	Endline Survey (May -October 2011)
Male Head-of-Household Questionnaire	4,895 participants in 500 villages	4,666 participants in 474 villages	4,354 participants in 447 villages,
Male Focus Group Questionnaire	5,334 participants in 500 villages	3,197 participants in 469 villages	2,835 participants in 415 villages
Female Focus Group Questionnaire	3,670 participants in 406 villages	2,792 participants in 424 villages	2,779 participants in 374 villages
Female Household Questionnaire	Not Conducted	4,234 participants in 431 villages	3,843participants in 396 villages
Female Individual Questionnaire	3,398 participants in 406 villages	Not Conducted	Not Conducted

Note: Due to deterioration in security conditions, 11 treatment and 15 control villages could not be surveyed during the midline follow-up survey. During the endline survey 33 treatment and 26 control villages were not surveyed due to adverse security conditions. Cultural sensitivities precluded the administration of female household and female focus group questionnaires in an additional 21 control and 22 treatment villages at midline and in 24 control and 27 treatment villages at endline. In all cases the attrition was not related to the treatment status of the villages and differences between treatment and control groups in village-level attrition are not statistically significant.

Table A.3: Number of Male Household Respondents at Baseline, Midline, and Endline Surveys

		Baseline Survey		Midline Survey		Endline Survey	
		Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control	Treatment	Control
Baseline Survey	Same Individual	2,486	2,492	1,354	1,341	1,046	1,132
	Same Household			185	155	201	211
	Same Compound			109	121	65	70
Midline Survey	Same Individual			2,367	2,299	1,434	1,478
	Same Household					188	182
	Same Compound					90	104
Endline Survey	Same Individual					2,193	2,161
	Same Household						
	Same Compound						

Note: Values represent number of male household questionnaires administered in each category. Boxes along the diagonal represent the number of questionnaires administered in the respective survey, while off-diagonal boxes represent the number of respondents which overlap in the respective category (same individual, household or compound) and the respective surveys.

Table A.4. Summary Statistics for Outcome Variables (continuation).

	Control Group				Treatment Group			
	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation
	Midline		Endline		Midline		Endline	
Panel A								
Economic Outcomes								
Income Earned in Past Year	7.04	0.64	7.31	0.74	7.08	0.64	7.36	0.69
Seasons in Which Income Was Earned	3.01	1.07	3.30	1.03	3.07	1.05	3.34	1.01
Sources of Income Include Sectors Other than Subsistence Agriculture	0.65	0.48	0.81	0.39	0.68	0.47	0.81	0.39
Annual Expenditure	7.51	0.66	7.68	0.70	7.51	0.63	7.68	0.67
Ratio of Food Expenditure to Total Expenditure	-0.62	0.19	-0.54	0.20	-0.62	0.19	-0.55	0.20
Principal Component of Livestock Assets (Aggregate)	-0.04	1.53	-0.01	1.59	0.04	1.50	0.01	1.57
Principal Component of Household Assets (Aggregate)	0.02	1.50	-0.01	1.43	-0.02	1.26	0.01	1.32
Amount Borrowed in Past Year	-6.22	0.96	-5.52	2.52	-6.19	0.98	-5.34	2.59
Borrowed for Food or Medical Needs in Past Year	-0.83	0.37	-0.77	0.42	-0.83	0.38	-0.75	0.43
Daily Caloric Intake Per Household Member During Past Week	8.01	0.42	7.96	0.41	8.03	0.43	7.97	0.40
Household Experienced Hunger On At Least One Day in Past Week	0.24	0.43	0.49	0.50	0.24	0.42	0.47	0.50
Access to Public Goods								
Primary Source of Drinking Water is Protected Source	0.37	0.48	0.32	0.47	0.41	0.49	0.37	0.48
Estimated Hours Spent Collecting Water in Past Week	2.23	0.99	1.03	0.69	2.29	0.95	0.99	0.62
Number of seasons in Past Year Water Was of Poor Quality	0.88	1.27	1.06	1.26	0.74	1.17	1.00	1.22
Number of seasons in Past Year Water Was Not Available	0.44	0.61	0.68	0.71	0.39	0.60	0.63	0.70
Logarithm of Hours of Electricity in Past Month	1.39	2.28	2.45	2.45	1.49	2.29	2.78	2.43
Economic Perceptions								
Perceived Improvement in Household's Situation in Past Year (Male)	0.35	0.48	0.15	0.35	0.41	0.49	0.16	0.37
Expected Improvement in Household's Situation Next Year (Male)	0.26	0.44	0.10	0.31	0.30	0.46	0.12	0.33
Perceived Improvement in Household's Situation in Past Year (Female)	0.29	0.45	0.17	0.38	0.34	0.47	0.21	0.41
Expected Improvement in Household's Situation Next Year (Female)	0.38	0.48	0.17	0.38	0.43	0.49	0.21	0.41
Ln(Net Number of Families Migrating to the Village)	0.37	2.09	0.09	2.01	0.86	1.99	0.56	1.94
Panel B								
Attitudes toward Government, Civil Society, and ISAF Soldiers								
District Governor Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.59	0.49	0.57	0.50	0.65	0.48	0.59	0.49
Provincial Governor Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.65	0.48	0.60	0.49	0.71	0.46	0.62	0.49
Central Government Officials Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.64	0.48	0.55	0.50	0.69	0.46	0.58	0.49
President of Afghanistan Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.76	0.43	0.69	0.46	0.80	0.40	0.72	0.45
Members of Parliament Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.50	0.50	0.40	0.49	0.56	0.50	0.41	0.49
Government Judges Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.46	0.50	0.34	0.47	0.51	0.50	0.37	0.48
National Police Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.71	0.46	0.74	0.44	0.72	0.45	0.76	0.43
NGO Employees Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.64	0.48	0.59	0.49	0.68	0.46	0.60	0.49
ISAF Soldiers Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.26	0.44	0.17	0.37	0.29	0.45	0.20	0.40
Panel C								
Security Perception by Male Respondents								
Security in and around Village Has Improved in Past Two Years	0.62	0.49	0.53	0.50	0.66	0.48	0.57	0.49
Security in and around Village Has Deteriorated in Past Two Years	0.13	0.34	0.21	0.41	0.12	0.33	0.20	0.40
Security Perception by Female Respondents								
Compared to Two Years Ago Women Feel More Safe in Working for NGOs or the Government or Attending Training Courses	0.29	0.45	0.30	0.46	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.47
Compared to Two Years Ago Women Feel Less Safe in Working for NGOs or the Government or Attending Training Courses	0.17	0.38	0.30	0.46	0.13	0.34	0.28	0.45
Compared to Two Years Ago Teenage Girls Feel More Safe when Traveling to and from School or Socializing	0.29	0.46	0.32	0.47	0.33	0.47	0.34	0.47
Compared to Two Years Ago Teenage Girls Feel Less Safe when Traveling to and from School or Socializing	0.21	0.41	0.32	0.47	0.18	0.38	0.29	0.45
Self-Reprted Security Incidents								
Village has Experienced Attack in the Past Year	0.04	0.19	0.07	0.26	0.03	0.18	0.07	0.25
Village has Experienced Attack by Anti-Government Elements in the Past Year	0.03	0.17	0.06	0.23	0.03	0.17	0.04	0.21
Respondent Household has been Affected by Insecurity in Village during the Past Year	0.01	0.12	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.14	0.04	0.19
Respondent Household has been Affected by Insecurity on Roads around District during the Past Year	0.02	0.15	0.06	0.24	0.03	0.16	0.06	0.24

Table A.5: Effect on Security Incidents - Alternative Methods of Aggregation

	Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident											
	First Principal Component						Equale Weighting (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007))					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.291	-0.322	-0.331	-0.338	-0.481	-0.406	-0.071	-0.082	-0.087	-0.090	-0.130	-0.110
	(0.161)*	(0.145)**	(0.181)*	(0.167)**	(0.226)**	(0.218)*	(0.042)*	(0.038)**	(0.047)*	(0.044)**	(0.059)**	(0.057)*
Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.455	-0.486	-0.572	-0.579	-0.717	-0.642	-0.119	-0.129	-0.151	-0.154	-0.192	-0.172
	(0.173)***	(0.165)***	(0.206)***	(0.199)***	(0.228)***	(0.217)***	(0.045)***	(0.043)***	(0.053)***	(0.052)***	(0.060)***	(0.057)***
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	-0.046	-0.077	-0.097	-0.104	-0.126	-0.050	-0.012	-0.022	-0.023	-0.025	-0.030	-0.010
	(0.159)	(0.157)	(0.197)	(0.193)	(0.217)	(0.203)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.057)	(0.053)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline			0.202	0.083	0.952	0.422			0.081	0.041	0.294	0.141
			(0.398)	(0.331)	(0.631)	(0.615)			(0.105)	(0.087)	(0.165)*	(0.161)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Endline			0.585	0.466	1.310	0.780			0.164	0.123	0.369	0.215
			(0.319)*	(0.282)*	(0.543)**	(0.529)			(0.082)**	(0.074)*	(0.142)***	(0.139)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at post-Endline			0.256	0.137	0.396	-0.134			0.057	0.016	0.094	-0.059
			(0.227)	(0.244)	(0.511)	(0.462)			(0.059)	(0.064)	(0.134)	(0.121)
Pastun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Midline					-1.682	-0.948					-0.459	-0.251
					(1.039)	(1.006)					(0.271)*	(0.262)
Pastun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Endline					-1.305	-0.570					-0.349	-0.141
					(0.900)	(0.904)					(0.235)	(0.237)
Pastun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					-0.177	0.558					-0.060	0.148
					(0.861)	(0.805)					(0.225)	(0.211)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at Midline					-0.133	-0.109					-0.036	-0.030
					(0.102)	(0.098)					(0.027)	(0.026)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at Endline					-0.151	-0.128					-0.040	-0.033
					(0.111)	(0.103)					(0.029)	(0.027)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					0.098	0.122					0.026	0.032
					(0.143)	(0.141)					(0.037)	(0.037)
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Midline					0.452	0.346					0.119	0.087
					(0.229)**	(0.204)*					(0.060)*	(0.054)
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Endline					0.324	0.218					0.079	0.047
					(0.207)	(0.193)					(0.053)	(0.050)
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					-0.124	-0.230					-0.027	-0.059
					(0.177)	(0.183)					(0.046)	(0.048)
Dependent Variable at Baseline		0.377		0.375		0.372		0.378		0.376		0.372
		(0.043)***		(0.043)***		(0.045)***		(0.042)***		(0.042)***		(0.045)***
Matched Pair-Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
R-squared	0.831	0.854	0.831	0.854	0.834	0.856	0.833	0.856	0.834	0.857	0.836	0.858

Note: Midline referes to the period from the start of the program in October 2010 until the completion of the Midline survey in September 2009; Endline refers to the period from the completion of the midline survey until the completion of the endline survey in September 2011; Post-Endline refers to the period from the completion of the Endline survey until the end of 2014. Measures of the share of Pashtuns, opium production, and the initial level of violence are demeaned. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.6: Effect on Security Incidents - Intensive Margine

	Logarithm of the Number of Security Incidents											
	Covariance Weighting (Anderson 2008)				First Principal Component				Equal Weighting (Kling, Liebman and Katz 2007)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.036	-0.039	-0.102	-0.091	-0.205	-0.231	-0.316	-0.298	-0.052	-0.060	-0.085	-0.081
	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.038)***	(0.032)***	(0.140)	(0.104)**	(0.143)**	(0.106)***	(0.038)	(0.028)**	(0.038)**	(0.029)***
Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.000	-0.004	-0.082	-0.071	-0.210	-0.237	-0.370	-0.352	-0.057	-0.065	-0.100	-0.095
	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.040)**	(0.035)**	(0.131)	(0.106)**	(0.138)***	(0.115)***	(0.034)*	(0.027)**	(0.036)***	(0.029)***
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.020	0.017	-0.035	-0.024	-0.117	-0.143	-0.219	-0.201	-0.030	-0.039	-0.055	-0.050
	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.129)	(0.125)	(0.130)*	(0.126)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline			0.332	0.259			0.557	0.336			0.168	0.102
			(0.143)**	(0.111)**			(0.424)	(0.321)			(0.115)	(0.086)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Endline			0.410	0.337			0.797	0.576			0.215	0.149
			(0.116)***	(0.098)***			(0.354)**	(0.273)**			(0.090)**	(0.070)**
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at post-Endline			0.279	0.206			0.511	0.289			0.125	0.058
			(0.103)***	(0.105)*			(0.396)	(0.394)			(0.102)	(0.102)
Dependent Variable at Baseline		0.397		0.380		0.524		0.518		0.511		0.505
		(0.053)***		(0.050)***		(0.043)***		(0.042)***		(0.040)***		(0.039)***
Matched Pair-Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
R-squared	0.887	0.910	0.893	0.914	0.918	0.944	0.920	0.944	0.919	0.945	0.921	0.945

Note: Midline referes to the period from the start of the program in October 2010 until the completion of the Midline survey in September 2009; Endline refers to the period from the completion of the midline survey until the completion of the endline survey in September 2011; Post-Endline refers to the period from the completion of the Endline survey until the end of 2014. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.7. Effect on Security Incidents, Heterogeneity with Additional Controls.

	Security Incidents	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.154	-0.127
	(0.051)***	(0.049)**
	[0.005]***	[0.015]**
Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.171	-0.143
	(0.061)***	(0.061)**
	[0.006]***	[0.021]**
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	-0.060	-0.033
	(0.054)	(0.051)
	[0.281]	[0.529]
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline	0.539	0.383
	(0.176)***	(0.165)**
	[0.004]***	[0.024]**
Proximity to Pakistant × Treatment Effect at Endline	0.540	0.384
	(0.155)***	(0.159)**
	[0.002]***	[0.019]**
Proximity to Pakistant × Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.399	0.243
	(0.143)***	(0.137)*
	[0.011]**	[0.075]*
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.461	-0.282
	(0.242)*	(0.229)
	[0.072]*	[0.222]
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.481	-0.303
	(0.231)**	(0.236)
	[0.051]*	[0.210]
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at post-Endline	-0.352	-0.173
	(0.235)	(0.230)
	[0.154]	[0.455]
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.043	-0.040
	(0.025)*	(0.025)
	[0.099]*	[0.128]
Opium Production ×Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.031	-0.028
	(0.028)	(0.027)
	[0.283]	[0.311]
Opium Production ×Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.014	0.018
	(0.030)	(0.030)
	[0.672]	[0.588]
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Midline	0.103	0.084
	(0.066)	(0.060)
	[0.146]	[0.174]
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Endline	0.067	0.048
	(0.047)	(0.047)
	[0.186]	[0.290]
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.009	-0.011
	(0.054)	(0.056)
	[0.882]	[0.849]
Outcome Variable at Baseline		0.278
		(0.041)***
Matched Pair-Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,500	1,500
R-squared	0.838	0.853
Treatment Effect at Midline in Districts in Close Proximty to Pakistan	0.385	0.256
	(0.150)**	(0.138)*
	[0.016]**	[0.075]*
Treatment Effect at Endline in Districts in Close Proximty to Pakistan	0.370	0.241
	(0.115)***	(0.118)**
	[0.005]***	[0.045]**
Treatment Effect at post-Endline in Districts in Close Proximty to Pakistan	0.339	0.210
	(0.113)***	(0.111)*
	[0.005]***	[0.057]*

Note: Dependent variable is a weighted average of measures for different radii following Anderson (2008). Midline referes to the period from the start of the program in October 2010 until the completion of the Midline survey in September 2009; Endline refers to the period from the completion of the midline survey until the completion of the endline survey in September 2011; Post-Endline refers to the period from the completion of the Endline survey until the end of 2014. Measures of the share of Pashtuns, opium production, and the initial level of violence are demeaned. Proximity to Pakistan is a dummy variable for the villages in the two districts bordering Pakistan. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in round brackets. P-value based on randomization inference in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.8: Effect on Security incidents, by Radii

Panel A	Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident														
Radius:	1 km	2 km	3 km	4 km	5 km	6 km	7 km	8 km	9 km	10 km	11 km	12 km	13 km	14 km	15 km
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.012	0.008	0.012	0.008	-0.020	-0.036	-0.060	-0.072	-0.072	-0.064	-0.040	-0.040	-0.024	-0.036	-0.060
	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.032)*	(0.033)**	(0.033)**	(0.031)**	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.027)**
Treatment Effect at Endline	0.020	0.028	-0.032	-0.052	-0.044	-0.056	-0.076	-0.084	-0.104	-0.100	-0.092	-0.068	-0.060	-0.040	-0.028
	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.027)*	(0.029)	(0.033)*	(0.033)**	(0.035)**	(0.036)***	(0.033)***	(0.032)***	(0.028)**	(0.028)**	(0.029)	(0.029)
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.000	0.020	-0.040	-0.028	0.004	-0.024	-0.044	-0.032	-0.004	-0.012	0.012	0.024	0.016	0.016	0.000
	(0.035)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.014)
R-squared	0.605	0.687	0.750	0.761	0.759	0.755	0.757	0.738	0.749	0.767	0.785	0.805	0.823	0.821	0.820
Panel B	Logarithm of the Number of Security Incidents														
Radius:	1 km	2 km	3 km	4 km	5 km	6 km	7 km	8 km	9 km	10 km	11 km	12 km	13 km	14 km	15 km
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.011	0.007	0.007	0.009	-0.037	-0.043	-0.065	-0.075	-0.099	-0.114	-0.092	-0.088	-0.065	-0.061	-0.085
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.048)**	(0.048)**	(0.046)**	(0.046)*	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.043)**
Treatment Effect at Endline	0.013	0.072	0.017	-0.055	-0.063	-0.066	-0.073	-0.115	-0.143	-0.151	-0.144	-0.126	-0.087	-0.091	-0.075
	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.043)	(0.044)*	(0.049)**	(0.051)***	(0.053)***	(0.051)***	(0.050)**	(0.050)*	(0.052)*	(0.055)
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	0.033	0.124	0.004	-0.033	-0.016	-0.051	-0.104	-0.112	-0.129	-0.126	-0.096	-0.063	-0.043	-0.049	-0.066
	(0.049)	(0.068)*	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.069)*	(0.066)*	(0.063)	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.052)
R-squared	0.621	0.758	0.827	0.861	0.885	0.903	0.909	0.910	0.917	0.922	0.929	0.933	0.939	0.940	0.943

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Each column in a panel corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions have 1500 observations Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in round brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.9: Effect on Security incidents, by Radii

Panel A	Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident														
Radius:	1 km	2 km	3 km	4 km	5 km	6 km	7 km	8 km	9 km	10 km	11 km	12 km	13 km	14 km	15 km
Regions Not Bordering Pakistan ×	-0.015	-0.030	-0.020	-0.020	-0.040	-0.040	-0.055	-0.055	-0.050	-0.045	-0.035	-0.035	-0.030	-0.045	-0.075
Treatment Effect at Midline	(0.013)	(0.022)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)**
Regions Not Bordering Pakistant ×	0.000	-0.020	-0.045	-0.080	-0.065	-0.075	-0.085	-0.085	-0.095	-0.100	-0.110	-0.080	-0.075	-0.050	-0.035
Treatment Effect at Endline	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.031)**	(0.030)**	(0.035)**	(0.038)**	(0.040)**	(0.042)**	(0.039)**	(0.039)***	(0.035)**	(0.035)**	(0.036)	(0.037)
Regions Not Bordering Pakistant ×	-0.050	-0.040	-0.045	-0.035	0.005	-0.025	-0.055	-0.040	-0.005	-0.015	0.015	0.030	0.020	0.020	0.000
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	(0.033)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.041)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.017)
Regions Bordering Pakistan ×	0.000	0.160	0.140	0.120	0.060	-0.020	-0.080	-0.140	-0.160	-0.140	-0.060	-0.060	0.000	0.000	0.000
Treatment Effect at Midline	(0.075)	(0.086)*	(0.089)	(0.073)	(0.089)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.081)*	(0.078)**	(0.074)*	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions Bordering Pakistant ×	0.100	0.220	0.020	0.060	0.040	0.020	-0.040	-0.080	-0.140	-0.100	-0.020	-0.020	0.000	0.000	0.000
Treatment Effect at Endline	(0.082)	(0.061)***	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.078)	(0.088)	(0.063)	(0.068)	(0.061)**	(0.056)*	(0.035)	(0.020)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Regions Bordering Pakistant ×	0.200	0.260	-0.020	0.000	0.000	-0.020	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	(0.104)*	(0.099)***	(0.069)	(0.045)	(0.028)	(0.019)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(.)	(.)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
R-squared	0.615	0.702	0.752	0.763	0.760	0.755	0.757	0.739	0.750	0.768	0.786	0.805	0.823	0.821	0.821
Panel B	Logarithm of the Number of Security Incidents														
Radius:	1 km	2 km	3 km	4 km	5 km	6 km	7 km	8 km	9 km	10 km	11 km	12 km	13 km	14 km	15 km
Regions Not Bordering Pakistan ×	-0.012	-0.031	-0.030	-0.036	-0.065	-0.069	-0.079	-0.087	-0.093	-0.100	-0.085	-0.085	-0.092	-0.093	-0.119
Treatment Effect at Midline	(0.009)	(0.017)*	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.036)*	(0.038)*	(0.042)*	(0.044)*	(0.045)**	(0.046)**	(0.045)*	(0.048)*	(0.048)*	(0.051)*	(0.051)**
Regions Not Bordering Pakistant ×	-0.005	-0.024	-0.048	-0.108	-0.103	-0.112	-0.103	-0.142	-0.149	-0.164	-0.168	-0.153	-0.129	-0.122	-0.102
Treatment Effect at Endline	(0.017)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.040)***	(0.040)**	(0.045)**	(0.045)**	(0.052)***	(0.054)***	(0.054)***	(0.055)***	(0.055)***	(0.057)**	(0.060)**	(0.061)*
Regions Not Bordering Pakistant ×	-0.051	-0.048	-0.093	-0.084	-0.034	-0.070	-0.109	-0.124	-0.112	-0.114	-0.085	-0.056	-0.060	-0.069	-0.092
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.049)*	(0.061)	(0.063)	(0.067)	(0.069)	(0.072)*	(0.071)	(0.071)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.066)	(0.066)	(0.063)
Regions Bordering Pakistan ×	-0.006	0.161	0.158	0.190	0.076	0.064	-0.012	-0.030	-0.123	-0.174	-0.119	-0.100	0.042	0.066	0.052
Treatment Effect at Midline	(0.061)	(0.099)	(0.094)*	(0.097)*	(0.117)	(0.113)	(0.141)	(0.159)	(0.162)	(0.157)	(0.140)	(0.130)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.061)
Regions Bordering Pakistant ×	0.089	0.459	0.281	0.156	0.094	0.119	0.046	-0.009	-0.119	-0.102	-0.047	-0.017	0.079	0.030	0.037
Treatment Effect at Endline	(0.119)	(0.186)**	(0.128)**	(0.105)	(0.115)	(0.116)	(0.121)	(0.133)	(0.142)	(0.153)	(0.136)	(0.120)	(0.105)	(0.110)	(0.130)
Regions Bordering Pakistant ×	0.373	0.808	0.388	0.171	0.055	0.022	-0.081	-0.063	-0.196	-0.175	-0.137	-0.089	0.029	0.032	0.037
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	(0.197)*	(0.242)***	(0.236)	(0.241)	(0.263)	(0.238)	(0.264)	(0.230)	(0.200)	(0.171)	(0.151)	(0.118)	(0.098)	(0.078)	(0.072)
R-squared	0.638	0.789	0.835	0.864	0.886	0.904	0.909	0.910	0.917	0.922	0.929	0.933	0.939	0.940	0.943

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Each column in a panel corresponds to a separate regression. All regressions have 1500 observations Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in round brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.10: Correlation between Objective and Subjective Measures of Violence

Panel A	Security Perception by Male Respondents		Security Perception by Female Respondents		Self-Reported Security Incidents	
Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident	-0.026	-0.084	0.017	0.032	-0.001	-0.018
(Covariance Weighting; Anderson 2008)	(0.028)	(0.032)***	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.040)
District-Survey fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Matched pairs-survey fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,962	8,962	7,000	7,000	8,965	8,965
R-squared	0.216	0.341	0.185	0.353	0.127	0.303
Panel B	**Security Perception by Male Respondents**		**Security Perception by Female Respondents**		**Self-Reported Security Incidents**	
Logarithm of the Number of Security Incidents	-0.077	-0.127	-0.041	0.013	-0.052	-0.063
(Covariance Weighting; Anderson 2008)	(0.035)**	(0.041)***	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.030)*	(0.038)
District-Survey fixed effects	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Matched pairs-survey fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	8,962	8,962	7,000	7,000	8,965	8,965
R-squared	0.217	0.343	0.185	0.353	0.128	0.303

Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.11: Effect on Individual Measures of Security Perceptions

Variable:	Treatment Effect at Midline (1)	Treatment Effect at Endline (2)	Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline (3)	Proximity to Pakistant × Treatment Effect at Endline (4)	p-value for (1)+ (3)=0	p-value for (2)+(4)=0	Obs.	R^2
Panel A. Security Perception by Male Respondents								
Security in and Around Village has Improved in Past Two Years	0.050	0.044					8,962	0.306
	(0.013)***	(0.015)***						
	0.058	0.044	-0.045	-0.003			8,962	0.306
	(0.015)***	(0.016)***	(0.032)	(0.043)	0.650	0.299		
Security in and Around Village has Deteriorated in Past Two Years	-0.019	-0.001					8,962	0.322
	(0.009)**	(0.011)						
	-0.026	-0.001	0.041	-0.003			8,962	0.322
	(0.010)***	(0.012)	(0.021)*	(0.038)	0.425	0.920		
Panel B. Security Perception by Female Respondents								
Compared to Two Years Ago Women Feel More Safe in Working For NGOs or The Government or Attending Training Courses	0.041	0.025					7,799	0.278
	(0.016)***	(0.016)						
	0.049	0.019	-0.054	0.102			7,799	0.278
	(0.017)***	(0.017)	(0.037)	(0.086)	0.873	0.155		
Compared to Two Years Ago Women Feel Less Safe in Working For NGOs or The Government or Attending Training Courses	-0.037	-0.002					7,870	0.355
	(0.014)***	(0.015)						
	-0.039	0.005	0.013	-0.125			7,870	0.356
	(0.015)**	(0.014)	(0.032)	(0.089)	0.361	0.172		
Compared to Two Years Ago Teenage Girls Feel More Safe when Traveling to and from School or Socializing	0.034	0.007					7,095	0.299
	(0.016)**	(0.018)						
	0.044	-0.000	-0.069	0.096			7,095	0.300
	(0.018)**	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.057)*	0.520	0.077		
Compared to Two Years Ago Teenage Girls Feel Less Safe when Traveling to and from School or Socializing	-0.036	-0.012					7,128	0.360
	(0.016)**	(0.014)						
	-0.037	-0.008	0.009	-0.052			7,128	0.360
	(0.016)**	(0.015)	(0.055)	(0.048)	0.591	0.190		
Panel C. Self-Reprted Security Incidents								
Village has Experienced Attack in the Past Year	-0.005	-0.010					8,984	0.324
	(0.008)	(0.010)						
	-0.003	-0.003	-0.007	-0.040			8,984	0.325
	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.020)**	0.400	0.008		
Village has Experienced Attack by Anti-Government Elements in the Past Year	-0.004	-0.012					8,985	0.314
	(0.007)	(0.009)						
	-0.003	-0.014	-0.008	0.011			8,985	0.314
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.015)	(0.012)	0.386	0.597		
Respondent Household has Been Affected by Insecurity in Village during the Past Year	0.002	0.008					8,972	0.233
	(0.005)	(0.006)						
	0.003	0.009	-0.003	-0.005			8,972	0.233
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.008)	1.000	0.424		
Respondent Household has Been Affected by Insecurity on Roads Around District during the Past Year	0.003	0.001					8,972	0.194
	(0.004)	(0.007)						
	0.003	0.001	-0.003	0.002			8,972	0.194
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.012)	1.000	0.761		

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.12: Effect on Individual Measures ofEconomic Outcomes and Public Goods Provision (Survey-Based Measures)

Variable:	Treatment Effect at Midline	Treatment Effect at Endline	Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline	Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Endline	p-value for (1)+ (3)=0	p-value for (2)+(4)=0	Obs.	R^2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)				
Panel A. Individual Economic Outcomes								
Income Earned in Past Year	0.038	0.044					8,870	0.242
	(0.019)**	(0.020)**						
	0.028	0.042	0.059	0.013			8,870	0.242
	(0.022)	(0.023)*	(0.031)*	(0.036)	0.000	0.045		
Seasons in Which Income Was Earned	0.042	0.032					8,875	0.227
	(0.029)	(0.027)						
	0.032	0.041	0.058	-0.052			8,875	0.227
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.078)	(0.070)	0.208	0.861		
Sources of Income Include Sectors	0.026	0.004					8,891	0.147
Other than Subsistence Agriculture	(0.013)**	(0.012)						
	0.033	0.012	-0.043	-0.046			8,891	0.148
	(0.013)**	(0.013)	(0.037)	(0.028)	0.773	0.164		
Annual Expenditure	0.008	-0.011					8,333	0.217
	(0.017)	(0.021)						
	0.003	0.010	0.033	-0.124			8,333	0.217
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.060)**	0.204	0.044		
Ratio of Food Expenditure to Total	0.000	-0.002					8,327	0.210
Expenditure	(0.005)	(0.005)						
	-0.000	-0.003	0.004	0.004			8,327	0.210
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.012)	0.770	0.921		
Principal Component of Livestock	0.071	0.036					8,937	0.320
Assets (Aggregate)	(0.041)*	(0.048)						
	0.067	0.048	0.029	-0.075			8,937	0.321
	(0.048)	(0.056)	(0.074)	(0.091)	0.094	0.705		
Principal Component of Household	-0.029	0.042					8,864	0.134
Assets (Aggregate)	(0.040)	(0.044)						
	-0.051	0.028	0.126	0.088			8,864	0.134
	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.098)	(0.079)	0.392	0.052		
Amount Borrowed in Past Year	0.041	0.176					8,106	0.198
	(0.029)	(0.084)**						
	0.076	0.129	-0.225	0.295			8,106	0.198
	(0.031)**	(0.069)*	(0.088)**	(0.376)	0.069	0.253		
Borrowed for Food or Medical Needs in	0.002	0.014					8,978	0.162
Past Year	(0.009)	(0.013)						
	0.002	0.013	0.001	0.006			8,978	0.162
	(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.030)	(0.054)	0.906	0.721		
Daily Caloric Intake Per Household	0.023	0.002					8,035	0.277
Member During Past Week	(0.011)**	(0.012)						
	0.032	0.003	-0.055	-0.017			8,035	0.277
	(0.012)**	(0.012)	(0.030)*	(0.026)	0.392	0.528		
Household Experienced Hunger On At	-0.009	-0.019					7,977	0.339
Least One Day in Past Week	(0.014)	(0.015)						
	-0.010	-0.018	0.007	-0.008			7,977	0.339
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.039)	(0.056)	0.924	0.622		
Panel B. Access to Public Goods								
Primary Source of Drinking Water is	0.051	0.061					8,038	0.385
Protected Source	(0.021)**	(0.022)***						
	0.047	0.060	0.026	0.010			8,038	0.385
	(0.021)**	(0.022)***	(0.079)	(0.099)	0.342	0.471		
Estimated Hours Spent Collecting	0.061	-0.051					7,987	0.510
Water in Past Week	(0.042)	(0.023)**						
	0.122	-0.035	-0.389	-0.266			7,987	0.513
	(0.044)***	(0.023)	(0.126)***	(0.140)*	0.025	0.029		
Number of Seasons in Past Year Water	-0.153	-0.066					7,581	0.256
was of Poor Quality	(0.049)***	(0.055)						
	-0.177	-0.074	0.154	0.161			7,581	0.256
	(0.055)***	(0.058)	(0.105)	(0.149)	0.796	0.526		
Number of Seasons in Past Year Water	-0.064	-0.058					7,375	0.242
was Not Available	(0.022)***	(0.029)**						
	-0.070	-0.052	0.039	-0.078			7,375	0.243
	(0.025)***	(0.031)*	(0.048)	(0.089)	0.450	0.119		
Logarithm of Hours of Electricity in	0.140	0.227					8,932	0.488
Past Month	(0.113)	(0.108)**						
	0.218	0.170	-0.459	0.348			8,932	0.489
	(0.121)*	(0.112)	(0.307)	(0.343)	0.393	0.110		
Panel C. Economic Perceptions								
Respondent Perceives Household's	0.047	0.018					8,981	0.242
Situation has Improved in the Past Year	(0.012)***	(0.011)*						
(Male Respondents)	0.044	0.017	0.015	0.007			8,981	0.242
	(0.014)***	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.035)	0.040	0.471		
Respondent Expects Economic Welfare	0.052	0.021					8,946	0.161
of Villagers to Improve Next Year	(0.011)***	(0.009)**						
(Male Respondents)	0.053	0.017	-0.008	0.026			8,946	0.161
	(0.013)***	(0.010)*	(0.029)	(0.028)	0.081	0.114		
Respondent Perceives Household's	0.056	0.049					8,032	0.202
Situation has Improved in the Past Year	(0.014)***	(0.012)***						
(Female Respondents)	0.044	0.042	0.079	0.118			8,032	0.203
	(0.016)***	(0.012)***	(0.027)***	(0.024)***	0.000	0.000		
Respondent Expects Economic Welfare	0.046	0.039					8,017	0.206
of Villagers to Improve Next Year	(0.014)***	(0.010)***						
(Female Respondents)	0.042	0.033	0.024	0.097			8,017	0.206
	(0.015)***	(0.010)***	(0.036)	(0.042)**	0.040	0.002		

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Hours of Electricity in the past month winsorized at 95 percent level. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in round brackets. Standard errors corrected for spatial correlation and serial correlation are in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.13: Effect on Individual Measures of Attitudes Toward Government (Survey-Based Measures)

Variable:	Treatment Effect at Midline (1)	Treatment Effect at Endline (2)	Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment (3)	Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment (4)	p-value for (1)+ (3)=0	p-value for (2)+(4)=0	Obs.	R^2
District Governor Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.058	0.034					8,499	0.273
	(0.014)***	(0.013)***						
	0.061	0.039	-0.016	-0.026			8,499	0.273
	(0.014)***	(0.015)**	(0.046)	(0.030)	0.309	0.625		
Provincial Governor Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.055	0.028					8,115	0.236
	(0.014)***	(0.014)**						
	0.077	0.033	-0.115	-0.027			8,115	0.237
	(0.014)***	(0.014)**	(0.038)***	(0.051)	0.282	0.893		
Central Government Officials Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.046	0.042					8,268	0.202
	(0.014)***	(0.014)***						
	0.061	0.039	-0.080	0.018			8,268	0.202
	(0.016)***	(0.013)***	(0.037)**	(0.055)	0.563	0.291		
President of Afghanistan Acts for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.040	0.024					8,655	0.200
	(0.012)***	(0.011)**						
	0.057	0.028	-0.097	-0.026			8,655	0.201
	(0.013)***	(0.012)**	(0.023)***	(0.029)	0.040	0.934		
Members of Parliament Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.062	0.017					8,605	0.222
	(0.014)***	(0.014)						
	0.079	0.021	-0.099	-0.019			8,605	0.223
	(0.015)***	(0.014)	(0.037)***	(0.042)	0.562	0.970		
Government Judges Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.051	0.030					8,645	0.199
	(0.015)***	(0.014)**						
	0.063	0.040	-0.066	-0.061			8,645	0.200
	(0.017)***	(0.016)**	(0.041)	(0.037)*	0.929	0.539		
National Police Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.016	0.018					8,836	0.206
	(0.013)	(0.014)						
	0.038	0.021	-0.130	-0.021			8,836	0.208
	(0.014)***	(0.015)	(0.035)***	(0.035)	0.005	0.992		
NGO Employees Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.046	0.011					8,676	0.174
	(0.014)***	(0.013)						
	0.063	0.008	-0.096	0.019			8,676	0.175
	(0.015)***	(0.014)	(0.038)**	(0.045)	0.332	0.527		
ISAF Soldiers Act for the Benefit of All Villagers	0.036	0.039					7,949	0.211
	(0.014)**	(0.012)***						
	0.041	0.048	-0.028	-0.049			7,949	0.211
	(0.017)**	(0.014)***	(0.023)	(0.018)***	0.391	0.920		

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Hours of Electricity in the past month winsorized at 95 percent level. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in round brackets. Standard errors corrected for spatial correlation and serial correlation are in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.14: Determinants of Attrition

Panel A. Village-Level Attrition	Village Surveyed at Midline	Village Surveyed at Enidline	Village Surveyed at Midline	Village Surveyed at Enidline	Predicted Probability of Village Surveyed at Midline	Predicted Probability of Village Surveyed at Endline
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment Village	0.016	-0.032			0.004	0.001
	(0.020)	(0.028)			(0.008)	(0.010)
Number of Security Incidents within 15 km of Village between January 2006 and Start of NSP			-0.009***	-0.004		
			(0.002)	(0.003)		
Number of Households in Village			-0.000	0.000		
			(0.000)	(0.000)		
Average Number of People in Household			-0.011	-0.017**		
			(0.007)	(0.008)		
Average Age			0.003**	0.003		
			(0.001)	(0.003)		
Pashtun Share of Population			0.017	-0.023		
			(0.029)	(0.058)		
Share of Unemployed Males			-0.076	0.129*		
			(0.067)	(0.073)		
Share of Males in Subsistance Agriculture or Husbandry			-0.051	-0.153***		
			(0.038)	(0.054)		
Share of Males Without Formal Education			-0.013	-0.156**		
			(0.048)	(0.064)		
Share of Land Owners			-0.057	-0.055		
			(0.047)	(0.057)		
Natural Log of Annual Household Consumption			0.090***	0.095***		
			(0.032)	(0.034)		
Observations	500	500	500	500	500	500
Panel B. Individual-Level Attrition						
Treatment Village	0.015	-0.034			-0.003	-0.002
	(0.025)	(0.023)			(0.004)	(0.005)
Number of People in Household			-0.002	-0.003		
			(0.002)	(0.002)		
Age of Respondent			0.001**	0.001**		
			(0.001)	(0.001)		
Respondent Speaks Pashtu as Mother Tongue			0.072**	0.088***		
			(0.028)	(0.029)		
Respondent is Unemployed			0.002	0.029		
			(0.043)	(0.037)		
Respondent is Employed in Subsistence Agriculture or Husbandry			0.002	0.010		
			(0.018)	(0.018)		
Resondent Received No Formal Education			0.009	0.003		
			(0.018)	(0.019)		
Respondent Owns Land			0.005	0.061***		
			(0.019)	(0.019)		
Ln(Annual Household Consumption)			0.057***	0.040***		
			(0.013)	(0.012)		
Observations	4,978	4,978	4,653	4,653	4,653	4,653

Note: . Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.15: Treatment Effect Heterogeneity with Respect to Predicted Probability of Attrition

	Individual Economic Outcomes	Access to Public Goods	Economic Perceptions	Attitudes toward Government, Civil Society, and ISAF Soldiers	Security Perception by Male Respondents	Security Perception by Female Respondents	Self-Reported Security Incidents
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A. Village-Level Attrition							
Treatment Effect at Midline	0.235	0.244	0.274	0.255	-0.057	-0.371	0.504*
	(0.165)	(0.406)	(0.194)	(0.318)	(0.358)	(0.397)	(0.268)
Treatment Effect at Endline	0.031	0.109	0.410*	0.329	-0.024	0.093	0.484**
	(0.151)	(0.336)	(0.217)	(0.210)	(0.320)	(0.344)	(0.219)
Predicted Probability of Village Surveyed × Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.230	-0.194	-0.169	-0.154	0.143	0.481	-0.525*
	(0.169)	(0.418)	(0.203)	(0.332)	(0.375)	(0.410)	(0.286)
Predicted Probability of Village Surveyed × Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.017	-0.050	-0.356	-0.289	0.078	-0.080	-0.523**
	(0.162)	(0.360)	(0.234)	(0.235)	(0.350)	(0.379)	(0.248)
Predicted Probability of Village Surveyed	0.064	0.130	-0.008	0.884***	0.219	-0.398	0.985***
	(0.141)	(0.309)	(0.187)	(0.249)	(0.295)	(0.309)	(0.289)
Observations	6,437	6,858	7,976	6,526	8,962	7,000	8,965
Panel B. Individual-Level Attrition							
Treatment Effect at Midline	0.032	0.238	0.025	0.425	0.525	0.197	0.062
	(0.100)	(0.188)	(0.152)	(0.204)**	(0.215)**	(0.216)	(0.175)
Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.107	0.170	-0.174	0.289	0.259	0.150	0.157
	(0.088)	(0.146)	(0.118)	(0.144)**	(0.132)*	(0.179)	(0.122)
Predicted Probability of Household Surveyed × Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.030	-0.329	0.185	-0.590	-0.840	-0.206	-0.112
	(0.190)	(0.360)	(0.279)	(0.369)	(0.397)**	(0.391)	(0.307)
Predicted Probability of Household Surveyed × Treatment Effect at Endline	0.348	-0.307	0.695	-0.585	-0.514	-0.323	-0.413
	(0.233)	(0.403)	(0.311)**	(0.358)	(0.342)	(0.479)	(0.286)
Predicted Probability of Household Surveyed	-0.143	0.107	-0.509	-0.117	0.111	0.067	0.084
	(0.146)	(0.227)	(0.204)**	(0.258)	(0.259)	(0.303)	(0.198)
Observations	5,738	6,176	7,162	5,829	8,052	6,285	8,052

Note: All regressions include matched pairs-survey fixed effects. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level are in brackets.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.16: Lee (2009) Bounds for Attrition Bias

		Individual Economic Outcomes	Access to Public Goods	Economic Perceptions	Attitudes toward Government, Civil Society, and ISAF Soldiers	Security Perception by Male Respondents	Security Perception by Female Respondents	Self-Reported Security Incidents
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Panel A. Village-Level Attrition								
Treatment Effect at Midline	Lower Bound	0.009	0.050***	0.098***	0.094***	0.071***	0.079***	-0.008
		(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.016)
Treatment Effect at Midline	Upper Bound	0.014	0.056***	0.104***	0.101***	0.082***	0.087***	0.007
		(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.018)
Treatment Effect at Endline	Lower Bound	0.009	0.045***	0.072***	0.051**	0.033	0.012	-0.005
		(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Treatment Effect at Endline	Upper Bound	0.021*	0.061***	0.088***	0.067***	0.048**	0.034	0.015
		(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.019)
Panel B. Individual-Level Attrition								
Treatment Effect at Midline	Lower Bound	0.011	0.071***	0.099***	0.078**	0.061*	0.079***	-0.008
		(0.016)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Treatment Effect at Midline	Upper Bound	0.018	0.075***	0.101***	0.150***	0.098**	0.087***	0.035
		(0.015)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Treatment Effect at Endline	Lower Bound	-0.029	0.027	0.066**	0.010	-0.045	-0.008	-0.054
		(0.024)	(0.036)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.045)
Treatment Effect at Endline	Upper Bound	0.069***	0.144***	0.181***	0.109**	0.083**	0.049	0.084***
		(0.027)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.032)

Note: The table shows lower and upper bounds for the effect of at-large elections that accounts for nonrandom attrition, as proposed by Lee (2009). Bootstraped standard errors based on 1000 repetitions in brackets.

Table A.17: Effect on Security, Reported Incidents with Cleared and Exploded IEDs Separately

	Occurrence of at Least One Cleared IEDs						Occurrence of at Least One Exploded IEDs					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Treatment Effect at Midline	-0.038	-0.020	-0.058	-0.050	-0.101	-0.092	-0.027	-0.021	-0.057	-0.055	-0.107	-0.102
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.026)**	(0.026)*	(0.043)**	(0.042)**	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.052)**	(0.052)**
Treatment Effect at Endline	-0.039	-0.020	-0.087	-0.080	-0.128	-0.119	-0.005	0.001	-0.070	-0.068	-0.124	-0.119
	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.045)*	(0.042)*	(0.055)**	(0.051)**	(0.044)	(0.042)	(0.039)*	(0.039)*	(0.062)**	(0.061)*
Treatment Effect at post-Endline	-0.039	-0.020	-0.072	-0.065	-0.145	-0.136	-0.009	-0.003	-0.042	-0.040	-0.079	-0.074
	(0.059)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.059)	(0.078)*	(0.078)*	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.062)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Midline			0.096	0.168	0.313	0.382			0.148	0.170	0.398	0.406
			(0.171)	(0.176)	(0.246)	(0.260)			(0.176)	(0.173)	(0.245)	(0.246)
Proximity to Pakistan × Treatment Effect at Endline			0.241	0.313	0.449	0.518			0.324	0.346	0.593	0.601
			(0.119)**	(0.108)***	(0.159)***	(0.138)***			(0.136)**	(0.119)***	(0.213)***	(0.196)***
Proximity to Pakistant × Treatment Effect at post-Endline			0.168	0.240	0.535	0.604			0.167	0.189	0.350	0.358
			(0.180)	(0.160)	(0.286)*	(0.256)**			(0.099)*	(0.086)**	(0.195)*	(0.180)**
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Midline					-0.345	-0.396					-0.480	-0.450
					(0.299)	(0.310)					(0.296)	(0.291)
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at Endline					-0.406	-0.457					-0.545	-0.515
					(0.200)**	(0.181)**					(0.261)**	(0.240)**
Pashtun Share of Population × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					-0.766	-0.817					-0.208	-0.178
					(0.357)**	(0.325)**					(0.278)	(0.271)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at Midline					-0.017	-0.020					-0.016	-0.018
					(0.016)	(0.017)					(0.023)	(0.024)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at Endline					-0.055	-0.057					-0.029	-0.031
					(0.028)*	(0.027)**					(0.023)	(0.024)
Opium Production × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					-0.012	-0.014					-0.018	-0.019
					(0.034)	(0.034)					(0.022)	(0.023)
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Midline					0.044	0.073					0.081	0.078
					(0.089)	(0.094)					(0.094)	(0.093)
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at Endline					0.120	0.150					0.115	0.111
					(0.064)*	(0.058)**					(0.064)*	(0.057)**
Initial Level of Violence × Treatment Effect at post-Endline					0.132	0.161					0.004	0.001
					(0.094)	(0.081)**					(0.060)	(0.054)
Dependent Variable at Baseline		0.183		0.216		0.229		0.249		0.259		0.254
		(0.071)**		(0.054)***		(0.044)***		(0.072)***		(0.071)***		(0.074)***
Matched Pair-Survey Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500	1,500
R-squared	0.814	0.819	0.816	0.823	0.821	0.829	0.829	0.837	0.833	0.841	0.836	0.844

Notes: Dependent variable is a weighted average following Anderson (2008). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the village-cluster level in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Table A.18: Summary Statistics for Security Incidents by Proximity to Pakistan.

	Control Group				Treatment Group			
	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation	Mean Level	Standard Deviation
	Midline		Endline		Midline		Endline	
Panel A								
Region Bordering Pakistan								
Occurance of Security Incidents within 1 km of a Village	0.14	0.35	0.20	0.40	0.14	0.35	0.30	0.46
Occurance of Security Incidents within 2 km of a Village	0.18	0.39	0.28	0.45	0.34	0.48	0.50	0.51
Occurance of Security Incidents within 5 km of a Village	0.64	0.48	0.62	0.49	0.70	0.46	0.66	0.48
Occurance of Security Incidents within 10 km of a Village	0.92	0.27	0.98	0.14	0.78	0.42	0.88	0.33
Occurance of Security Incidents within 15 km of a Village	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	0.00
Index for the Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident	0.88	0.33	0.90	0.30	0.74	0.44	0.82	0.39
Panel B								
Region Not Bordering Pakistan								
Occurance of Security Incidents within 1 km of a Village	0.03	0.17	0.04	0.20	0.01	0.12	0.04	0.20
Occurance of Security Incidents within 2 km of a Village	0.10	0.30	0.09	0.28	0.07	0.26	0.07	0.25
Occurance of Security Incidents within 5 km of a Village	0.24	0.43	0.23	0.42	0.20	0.40	0.16	0.37
Occurance of Security Incidents within 10 km of a Village	0.43	0.50	0.47	0.50	0.39	0.49	0.37	0.48
Occurance of Security Incidents within 15 km of a Village	0.59	0.49	0.64	0.48	0.52	0.50	0.60	0.49
Index for the Occurrence of at Least One Security Incident	0.37	0.48	0.40	0.49	0.32	0.47	0.30	0.46

Section 2: Figures

Figure A.1: Sign Board for NSP Project in Balkh Province

Figure A.2: Timeline of NSP Activities and Surveys in Sample Villages by District



Figure A.3: Histogram of the Distance to Pakistan Border for Villages in Two Districts that Border Pakistan.



Section 3: Documentation and Background Information

A. Sample Selection Procedures

The selection of the sample for the study proceeded in two stages. First, 10 districts were selected from 398 districts in Afghanistan to be included in the study. Second, 50 villages were selected in each of the 10 sample districts. The methods for these selections are described below.

Three main considerations guided the selection of sample districts:

1. *"New" NSP Districts*. In order to facilitate an experimental design, sample districts were selected from the 74 Afghan districts where NSP had not commenced prior to March 31, 2007. Randomization was infeasible outside this set of new districts either because the remaining districts were already fully covered by NSP, were in the process of getting fully covered by NSP, or were not intended to be covered by the program at this phase.

2. *Security*. Reducing the security risk to enumerators and participants was of paramount concern when selecting the sample districts for the study. More formally, security conditions had to be judged satisfactory not just by the government and NATO coalition forces on the ground, but also by Harvard University's human subjects committee. Security concerns that made the areas completely inaccessible for local enumerators eliminated 34 of the 74 new NSP districts from consideration for inclusion in the baseline survey. The selected districts were representative of the average security situation in the country excluding the southern really violent areas.

3. *Minimum of 65 Villages*. Procedures devised by the evaluation team to minimize adverse political or humanitarian consequences of the evaluation stipulated the inclusion of 50 villages per district in the study and the specification of an additional 15 non-evaluation villages for mobilization by NSP. This procedure limited eligibility for the study to districts with 65 villages or more, of which there were 23 new NSP districts.

Ten districts that satisfied all three criteria were included in the study: Balkh district in Balkh province; Khost Wa Firing in Baghlan; Sang Takht in Daykundi; Daulina district in Ghor province; Adraskan, Chisht-e Sharif, Gulran, and Farsi in Herat; and Hisarak and Sherzad in Nangarhar.[1]

The ten selected districts encompassed four districts in Herat province (Adraskan; Chisht-e Sharif; Fersi; and Gulran) in the western region; one district in Ghor province (Daulina) and one district in Daykundi province (Sang Takht) in the central region; one district in Balkh province (Balkh) and one

[1] The overall number of districts satisfying the criteria was eleven, but one of the districts was excluded from the study because of the delays in signing the contract between NSP and the NGO that was contracted for implementing the program.

district in Baghlan province (Khost Wa Firing) in the northern region; and two districts in Nangarhar province (Hisarak and Sherzad) in the eastern region.

In each of the ten sample districts, the NGO contracted for implementation of NSP was given responsibility for selecting the 50 sample villages to be included in the evaluation, with the understanding that the evaluation team would randomly select 25 of these villages for NSP mobilization.[2] In addition to the 50 sample villages, NGOs selected 15 additional villages in the district for participation in NSP that were not included in the evaluation. This was done in order to meet political or humanitarian imperatives dictating the prioritization of particular villages for NSP without jeopardizing the integrity of the empirical strategy for inference. The only constraint that was imposed on the selection of these 15 "priority" villages was that none of them appear in the list of 50 "sample" villages. In order to prevent contamination of the control group, the evaluation team took all feasible steps to ensure that the 15 priority villages did not overlap with the 25 NSP sample villages and, where GPS coordinates were available, that they were located a significant distance away from them.

NGOs assigned to implement NSP in the ten sample districts represented a mix of international and local NGOs that reflected the diversity of NGOs contracted to implement NSP across Afghanistan. Note that NGOs facilitating the implementation of NSP in the two Nangarhar districts that are considered separately in the analysis also facilitated NSP in other districts in the sample. The implementation of NSP in Sherzad district was facilitated by the international NGO, the Internal Rescue Committee (IRC), which also facilitated NSP in Gulran district in Herat province. The implementation of NSP in Hisarak district was facilitated by the international NGO, People-in-Need, which also facilitated NSP in Balkh district in Balkh province and Khost Wa Firing in Baghlan province.

[2] This approach was adopted to ensure that the procedures of the evaluation didn't impose unnecessary logistical costs or complications for participating NGOs. It was also motivated by the assumption that allowing NGOs to select the sample villages would minimize the probability of sample villages being ineligible for participation in NSP due to small size, or which, for security, political, or other reasons, would otherwise create problems if surveyed and/or mobilized by NSP.

B. Survey Instruments and Attrition

The baseline, midline, and endline surveys consisted of four survey instruments that ascertained key information from female and male villagers and female and male village leaders, as described below:[3]

1. *Male Household Questionnaire (MH).* For the baseline survey, the MH was administered to ten randomly selected male heads-of-household in each village.[4] For the midline survey, enumerators were provided with a list of the ten baseline MH interviewees and asked to administer the MH to this person or, if unavailable, to a male member of the same household or, failing that, to a co-habitant of the baseline respondent. If it was not possible to find a household surveyed at baseline, enumerators were asked to apply the procedure applied at baseline to randomly select a new household. During the endline survey, enumerators were similarly provided with a list of the ten MH interviewees from the midline survey and asked to administer the MH to this person or, if unavailable, to a male member of the same household or other co-habitant. If a household surveyed during the midline could not be located, enumerators were instructed to select a household surveyed in the baseline, but not surveyed in the midline. If it was not possible to find a household surveyed at midline or baseline, enumerators were asked to apply the procedure applied at baseline to randomly select a new household.

2. *Male Focus Group Questionnaire (MG).* The MG, a quantitative instrument,[5] was administered to a group of between six and nine key decision makers (which may include village leaders and/or members of the village council) convened by the enumerator. Midline and endline survey enumerators were not directed to specifically request the participation of those who took part in previous focus groups, although given the common method by which the focus groups were composed, some overlap is expected.

3. *Female Household Questionnaire / Female Individual Questionnaire (FH / FI).* In the midline and endline surveys, the FH was administered to the wife of the MH participant, or to another senior woman in the same household. The endline FH also included a full household roster and short sections administered to a girl aged between 7 and 10 in the household, if present, and a maternal section administered to another woman under 50, if not the respondent and if available. During the baseline survey, the FH was not administered. Instead, women who participated in the FG were invited to subsequently participate in an individually-administered interview (FI).

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[3] Instruments for all three surveys are available at the NSP-IE website.
[4] Households were randomly sampled based on a skip-pattern method, with intervals proportional to the size of the village. This procedure which provided a straightforward procedure for enumerators to follow and a random sample of households in areas considered free of periodicity.
[5] For this and all other questionnaires, enumerators asked a fixed list of questions (identical in treatment and control villages) and did not engage in semi-structured discussions sometimes undertaken in focus group discussions.

4. *Female Focus Group Questionnaire (FG).* The FG, also a quantitative instrument, was administered to a group of between six and nine women, who are expected to be wives or other relatives of the village leaders and/or members of the village women's council. As with the MG, midline and endline enumerators did not directly seek the participation of those who took part in previous focus groups.

C. Background Information on the Insurgency in Afghanistan

In 1994, the Taliban was formed in Kandahar and, in 1996, displaced the incumbent government and proceeded to establish control over much of the country. At the end of 2001, the Taliban regime was routed by the U.S. and the Northern Alliance, although a powerful neo-Taliban insurgency emerged in the subsequent years, resulting in a build-up of foreign forces in Afghanistan. The neo-Taliban functioned as a diverse and decentralized network that deployed guerilla tactics to demoralize Afghan government and foreign forces.

Taliban Rule in Afghanistan: 1994 – 2001

In the spring of 1994, amidst a violent anarchy precipitated by the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime two years earlier, a paramilitary commander abducted two girls from a village outside the southern city of Kandahar, shaved their heads, and took them to a military camp, where they were gang-raped. Word of the crimes reached the religious teacher of the village, Mullah Omar, who gathered thirty of his students (*Taliban* in the local language of Pashto), stormed the camp, and hung the offending commander from the barrel of a tank (Rashid [2000], p. 25).

By the summer of 1994, Mullah Omar was receiving regular appeals from the citizens of Kandahar to protect them from abuse by warlords and corrupt officials. Word of the movement reached religious schools across Afghanistan and Pakistan and thousands to join Mullah Omar's 'Taliban' movement. Trucking companies seeking lower tolls along the highway to Central Asia, as well as Pakistani and Saudi interests, provided materiel and financial support (Rashid [2000]). By the end of 1994, the Taliban wrested control of Kandahar province, after which they moved to take control of the southern and western regions of the country from incumbent warlords. In September 1996, following a prolonged battle with forces loyal to Afghanistan's *de jure* Defense Minister, Ahmad Shah Massoud, the Taliban entered Kabul and founded the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

In areas under their control, the Taliban imposed draconian laws informed by a mixture of Pashtun and Wahhabi codes. Photography, music, consumer technologies, and many forms of sport were banned. Men were forbidden from shaving their beards and were required to don head coverings. Women that wished to leave their house had to be accompanied by a male relative and wear the all-enveloping *burqa*. All occupations except the medical sector were closed to women and female education was precluded. Taliban policies were enforced by violent public punishments. In rural areas, governance structures were re-organized around local clergymen, with the Taliban mandating that only those trained in Islamic law should serve as heads of village councils.

After taking Kabul, the Taliban sought to extend its control over northern and central Afghanistan, regions largely (but not exclusively) inhabited by Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara populations that adhere to less conservative social codes than the Pashtun tribes that dominate southern Afghanistan. To rebuff

the Taliban's advance into northern Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, an Uzbek warlord, and Ahmad Shah Massoud formed the Northern Alliance. The Taliban nonetheless were able to overrun the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif in August 1998, forcing Dostum in to exile. In 1999, the Taliban further extended its authority by capturing Bamiyan province in the country's central highlands and, by 2001, had confined Northern Alliance activity to a handful of provinces in the northwest. On September 9, 2001, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated, removing one of the last obstacles to Taliban conquest of the entire country.

The Neo-Taliban Insurgency: 2001 - 2014

In the wake of the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. inserted special operators to link up with Northern Alliance forces and launched air strikes on Taliban positions. On November 9, Mazar-e Sharif fell and, just three days later, the Taliban withdrew from Kabul. Taliban authority rapidly disintegrated thereafter across much of Afghanistan and, by the end of November, the Taliban controlled only four of (the then) 30 provinces. The Taliban fell back on Kandahar, but with the advance of U.S. forces, abandoned the city on December 7.

In December 2001, the Bonn Agreement created the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – composed of U.S. forces and those of 18 allies – to secure Kabul and its immediate environs (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [2016]). In mid-2003, sporadic attacks by a regrouped Taliban (hereafter, neo-Taliban) inflicted limited casualties on Afghan government security, ISAF forces, and international aid workers in southern and eastern Afghanistan (Baldauf and Tohid [2003]). In addition, 'night letters' were circulated in southern Afghanistan urging villagers to overthrow the new regime (Associated Press [2013]). Given the emerging threat, ISAF's mandate was extended in October 2003 to encompass all of Afghanistan and, over the next three years, the coalition progressively established Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) bases in northern, western, southern, central, and eastern Afghanistan (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [2016]).

In mid-2006, the neo-Taliban launched a "full-blown insurgency" in southern Afghanistan,[6] "ambushing military patrols, assassinating opponents and even enforcing the law in remote villages" (Wiseman [2006]). From bases in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, ISAF – in conjunction with the nascent Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) – responded with large-scale clearance operations. Operation Mountain Thrust in mid-2006, for instance, spanned five southern provinces, involved 12,000 Afghan government and ISAF soldiers and resulted in the deaths of 1,000 Taliban and 150 soldiers (Ware [undated]). Nonetheless, the neo-Taliban established prolonged presence in many towns across the region. Musa Qala in Helmand province was ruled by the neo-Taliban for nine months before a British-led operation re-established government control in December 2007. Taliban

[6] According to Jones (2008), between 2005 and 2006, "suicide attacks quintupled from 27 to 139; remotely detonated bombings more than doubled from 783 to 1,677; and armed attacks nearly tripled from 1,558 to 4,542" (p. 7 – 8).

activity was also increasing in eastern and central Afghanistan, a trend which some local residents "attributed to the [behavior] of local officials whom they accuse of mistreating them" (Amani [2007]). As of October 2007, it was estimated that the neo-Taliban could field up to 10,000 fighters at any one time (Rohde [2007]).

Insurgent and terrorist attacks continued to proliferate across Afghanistan throughout 2008 and 2009 (Figure A.1). In January 2008, men disguised in police uniforms attacked a five-star hotel in central Kabul popular with foreign dignitaries, killing six people. The following month, a suicide bombing in Kandahar city killed over 100 people. In June, Taliban fighters attacked Kandahar jail and liberated the prisoners. In a year, U.S. casualties tripled from 865 to 2,455 (Chesser [2012]). By late 2009, the neo-Taliban had at least 25,000 "dedicated fighters" and "substantial influence in most key districts of Afghanistan" (O'Hanlon [2010]), achieving a "strategic stalemate, if not a slight advantage" over ISAF and the ANSF (Giustozzi [2012], p. 25).

In response to the deteriorating situation, ISAF member nations scrambled to deploy more troops. President Obama increased U.S. forces from 32,500 in December 2008 to 52,300 in March 2009 (Peters, Schwartz & Kepp [2015]) and, in December 2009, added an additional 30,000 troops. By April 2010, ISAF had 102,550 troops, up from 58,390 a year earlier (Figure A.2). ISAF also changed strategies, increasing the use of special operations to eliminate key neo-Taliban commanders, while simultaneously deploying development projects to win the hearts and minds of the population and technical assistance to build the capacity of the Afghan state (MacAskill [2009]; O'Hanlon [2010]). The insurgency nonetheless proliferated and intensified. U.S. casualties more than doubled from 2009 (Chesser [2012]), and the Afghan NGO Safety Office reported that insurgent attacks increased sharply across two-thirds of the country (Nordland [2011]). In spite the increasing violence, "[b]y early 2011, it became evident that the [neo-Taliban] were losing ground for the first time in a number of areas, particularly Kunduz and some parts of Helmand and Kandahar" (Giustozzi [2012], p. 25).

In June 2011, President Obama confirmed that 33,000 troops would be withdrawn over the next year and that withdrawals would continue at a steady pace until the Government of Afghanistan assumed responsibility for security in Afghanistan in 2014. Other ISAF contributors executed similar withdrawal plans. By December 2012, U.S. troop levels had fallen to the pre-surge level of 65,800. In 2013, ISAF withdrew troops from villages, transferring the responsibility for providing security in rural areas to the ANSF, and in December 2014, President Obama announced the conclusion of the combat mission in Afghanistan, with remaining troops providing advice and training to Afghan forces. As troops withdrew, violence receded in southern Afghanistan, although increased in other regions, particularly in the eastern and western regions.[7]

7 Giustozzi (2012) notes that by early 2011, the Taliban were gaining ground in Nangarhar "and recovering strength in western Afghanistan".

Structure and Tactics of the Neo-Taliban Insurgency

The neo-Taliban was formed by members of the original Taliban who dispersed across Afghanistan and into Pakistan following the defeat of the regime in 2001, supplemented by Pakistani-trained mullahs and religious students (Giustozzi [2012], p. 23). As the insurgency sought to expand after 2003, the Taliban – via "political agents and preachers" – recruited support from and then infiltrated communities that had suffered "discrimination by government officials or that felt short-changed in the post-2001 distribution of [aid, services, and favors]" (Ibid., p. 23).[8] Via the internet, radio, pamphlets, propaganda videos, and other media, the Taliban also directly recruited individuals disaffected by the presence of foreign forces and by other government policies (Ibid., p. 23). Given the extent to which the high casualty rate among fighters drove away "opportunists and mercenaries", it is considered that the ranks of the neo-Taliban have been mostly filled by those driven by ideological and/or religious motives (Ibid, p. 24).

Descriptions of the composition of the neo-Taliban noted three distinct groups of fighters: a core-group of "highly motivated, full-time [Afghan national] insurgents," estimated to make up 20-30 percent of the neo-Taliban's 10,000 fighters in 2007; a wider group of "young Afghan men who have been alienated by government corruption, who are angry at civilian deaths caused by American bombing raids, or who are simply in search of cash" and who fight part-time; and a small group of foreign insurgents from Chechnya, China, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and various Arab countries, who serve as mid-level commanders, trainers, and financiers, and who make up 5-10 percent of the group of full-fighters (Rodhe [2007]). The neo-Taliban has been estimated to be 93 percent Pashtun, with the remaining seven percent drawn from a mix of "Uzbeks, Tajiks, Pashais, and others" (Giustozzi [2012]., p. 25).

In addition to the neo-Taliban, a number of other ideologically-aligned groups actively fought ANSF-ISAF over the 2001-14 period. The most prominent of these groups was the Haqqani Network, regarded as "the most capable and dangerous insurgent organization in Afghanistan" (Dressler [2012], p. 11).[9] Based in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the Haqqani Network was active in the eastern provinces and was responsible for several high-profile attacks (Gopal [2009]). Another group, the Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, led by the former Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, predominated in the northeastern provinces and regularly attacked ANSF-ISAF forces and allied actors, although clashed sporadically with the neo-Taliban (Daily Times [2010]). Dressler (2012) notes that Nangarhar has been used particularly by the Haqqani Network to traffic

8 Giustozzi (2012) notes that "many of the casualties inflicted by ISAF were Taliban allies, such as mobilized community youth, rather than core Taliban, particularly in southern Afghanistan" (p. 33).

9 According to Dressler (2012) "[t]he Haqqanis have long disregarded Mullah Omar's public orders to avoid civilian casualties, mounting spectacular suicide attacks and assassinations of key security and political figures in Kabul and elsewhere" (p. 11) and "emplace sophisticated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to restrict U.S. forces' ability to interfere with Haqqani operations in southeastern Afghanistan" (p. 15).

Uzbek fighters representing the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan "through eastern Afghanistan to the country's northern provinces" (p. 30). As of July 2013, the district administrator of Hisarak reported that "over 1,000 local and foreign militants were active in the district" and had been out of the government's control for seven months (Mahbob [2013]). Dressler (2012) farther notes that the Haqqani Network is active in "the districts of Hisarak, Sherzad, Chaparhar, and Jalalabad", which enables "the network to project force into the provincial capital of Jalalabad, transit east to Kabul, or smuggle men and materials into northern Laghman and Kapisa provinces" and that captured Haqqani operatives in Nangarhar have been "involved in planning, organizing, and facilitating attacks on Afghan government officials and security forces in and around" the provincial capital of Jalalabad (p. 30).

Foschini (2011) notes that the Haqqani Network sends "people across the Spinghar mountain range from Kurram Tribal Agency into Nangrahar" and that "[n]otwithstanding its considerable altitude, cross-border movement through the Spinghar remained a major factor of strength for insurgents in the southern districts of Nangrahar for the last years", with "[b]oth Afghan and Pakistani Taleban aim mostly at the three Khugiani-inhabited districts of Khugiani, Sherzad and Pachir o Aga". Mansfield (2014) notes that, "[c]laims of cross-border support for Afghan insurgent groups in the southern districts also persisted, bolstered by reports of Waziri [Pakistani] militants in the mountainous villages of Khogiani and Sherzad" (p. 13). During the administration of the endline survey, enumerators also reported that a number of villages in Hisarak and Sherzad were inaccessible due to the presence of "Pakistani Taliban".

The Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) also reportedly established bases in Afghanistan's eastern provinces, which were used to launch cross-border attacks (Khan [2012]). Collectively more numerous than these large groups were hundreds of local militias which regularly switched allegiances between the neo-Taliban and the government (Foschini [2014]).[10]

The porous border between Afghanistan and the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan has been a key asset for the neo-Taliban and has been used both: (i) to insert materiel and foreign and foreign-based fighters (Johnson and Mason [2007]; Jones [2008]; Giustozzi [2010]; European Asylum Support Office [2012]; and Giustozzi and Ibrahimi [2012]) to "reinforce, organize, and toughen the stance of local insurgent fronts" (Foschini [2014]); and (ii) as a sanctuary from which low-risk raids could be conducted on ISAF and ANSF outposts (Jones [2008], Bumiller [2010]). Two areas, in particular, were subject to relatively heavy cross-border flows: (i) the "Parrot's Beak" at the

10 Foschini (2014) reports that in Laghman province, the commanders of some local armed groups "who used to be affiliated with the insurgency or even the old Taleban regime, but have accepted the offers of the PRT in order to make economic gains and preserve their assets" are derisively referred to as "Taleban-e PRT".

intersection of Pakistan's Kurram Agency and the Afghanistan provinces of Logar, Nangarhar, and Paktia provinces;[11] and (ii) Zabul province (Dorronsoro [2009], p. 22 – 23).

While Mullah Omar remained the leader of the neo-Taliban until his death in 2013, the insurgency has functioned as a decentralized "collection of small religious networks" (Giustozzi [2012], p. 20). Large-scale operations or even well-planned tactical operations were rare (Ibid.). Instead, commanders exercised substantial autonomy, but drew on a limited template of unsophisticated yet effective modes of attack. Initially, tactics drew heavily on those developed during the anti-Soviet jihad, such as ambushing patrols or attacking ISAF outposts with RPGs and small arms fire. After 2007, however, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) ordinarily followed by RPGs and small arms fire – were increasingly used to attack ANSF-ISAF patrols and convoys (Giustozzi [2012]).[12]

The neo-Taliban exploited the absence of government administrative structures below the district level, established parallel local administrations, and then denied access of the central government to the area by attacking and intimidating the police and civil administrators.[13] The ability of the neo-Taliban to rebuff attempts by ANSF-ISAF to regain control has often been dependent on support provided by communities to withhold intelligence from ANSF-ISAF and/or provide sanctuary to insurgents and has, in turn, been ordinarily facilitated by the connections between insurgents and communities. In a 2011 report, the U.S. Department of Defense for instance noted that, "[t]he majority of insurgent fighters and commanders operate in or near their home districts, and low-level insurgent fighters are often well-integrated into the local population" (U.S. Department of Defense [2011], p. 59). To ensure support, the neo-Taliban leadership sought to limit civilian casualties and allowed commanders to moderate the movement's strict edicts (Ibid., p. 26).

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[11] Dressler (2012) notes that, "Kurram Agency, which borders North Waziristan to the east and north, has also been a region of special strategic importance to Afghanistan-focused insurgents because it served as a staging ground for the Afghan Mujahideen in the 1980s. The northwestern protrusion of the agency into eastern Afghanistan offers the shortest route to Kabul and the ability to bypass Khost from the east as well as to operate into Nangarhar Province to the north . . . Although Soviet and Afghan government military forces attempted to seal the border between Kurram and Afghanistan during the 1980s, they failed to do so." (p. 14).

[12] O'Hanlon (2010) notes that, "in smaller-scale attacks, insurgents adopted the practice of detonating roadside bombs to create initial injury and panic and then firing small arms against any incapacitated vehicles and Afghan and NATO security forces".

[13] Dorronsoro (2009) notes that, "[t]he Taliban are systematically destroying the local administrations at the district level, with the objective of creating a situation where the administrations' contact with the population is eliminated. Such a situation would prove to people that the state is unable to protect them or provide services, pushing them to instead accept the justice and order the Taliban provide . . . In some places the state no longer has a physical presence: the district administrator is often unable to travel to the district center." (p. 25). O'Hanlon (2010) notes that, "[t]he Taliban had learned to present a kinder, gentler face, so to speak, than it had when it ruled Afghanistan from the mid-1990s until 2001 [but] . . . in classic Mafia style, it continued to carry out just enough violence to be feared".

Despite the preponderance of local insurgents, "out-of-area" fighters – whether foreign fighters or insurgents from other parts of the country – became concentrated in certain strategic areas.[14] Such fighters possess rare technical expertise, but also tend to be "more ideological in nature and less tolerant of local norms" (Ibid. p. 59) and, in particular, act as enforcers against pragmatist elements.[15] The differences in approach between local and 'out-of-area' insurgents was particularly apparent in how insurgents reacted to development projects. Such projects posed a conundrum as they were both appreciated by villagers and also represented a means by which the government could build legitimacy. While local insurgents generally tolerated such projects – even allowing girls' schools to operate –[16] 'out-of-area' insurgents generally did not. One account notes that:

> *In the southern provinces of Oruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand, Afghan villagers recently described two distinct groups of Taliban fighters. They said "local Taliban" allowed some development projects. But "foreign Taliban" — usually from Pakistan — threatened to kill anyone who cooperated with the Afghan government or foreign aid groups. Hanif Atmar, the Afghan education minister, said threats from foreign Taliban have closed 40 percent of the schools in southern Afghanistan. He said many local Taliban oppose the practice, but foreign Taliban use brutality and cash to their benefit."* (Rodhe [2007])

Similarly and of particular relevance to the study, Foschini (2011) notes that "[t]he more brutal acts of violence – like the murder of two local Community Development Council workers in Rodat district of Nangarhar . . . are usually ascribed to foreign, or anyway not local, insurgents".

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[14] The presence of "out-of-area" fighters often increased in the wake of ANSF-ISAF clearance operations when, due to the additional need for discretion, the Taliban would adapt by rotating full-time staff into and out of the district and by staffing administrative and judicial structures with "people from outside the district" (Giustozzi [2012]).

[15] Foschini (2014) notes that, "in [Koghyani] district of Nangarhar . . ., a new breed of militants appeared shortly before the start of the [neo-Taliban] offensive . . . and visited villages to punish those working with the government".

[16] Foschini (2011) notes the "relaxed modus operandi [of the neo-Taliban in many areas] towards NGOs or even Afghan security forces caused by the insurgents' deep roots in local communities" and that, "many locals from Kunar [province in eastern Afghanistan] reported to [the Afghanistan Analysts Network] that local insurgents have accepted to allow schools, even for girls, to function"

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